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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents results from a study that identified patterns of social interaction among small farmers 
in three agricultural subsectors in Bolivia—fish culture, peanut production, and quinoa production—and 
analyzed how social interaction influences farmers’ behavior toward the adoption of pro-poor 
innovations. Twelve microregions were identified, four in each subsector, setting the terrain for an 
analysis of parts of social networks that deal with the diffusion of specific sets of innovations. Three 
hundred sixty farmers involved in theses networks as well as 60 change agents and other actors promoting 
directly or indirectly the diffusion of innovations were interviewed about the interactions they maintain 
with other agents in the network and the sociodemographic characteristics that influence their adoption 
behavior.  
The information derived from this data collection was used to test a wide range of hypotheses on 
the impact that the embeddedness of farmers in social networks has on the intensity with which they 
adopt innovations. Evidence provided by the study suggests that persuasion, social influence, and 
competition are significant influences in the decisions of farmers in poor rural regions in Bolivia to adopt 
innovations. The results of this study are meant to attract the attention of policymakers and practitioners 
who are interested in the design and implementation of projects and programs fostering agricultural 
innovation and who may want to take into account the effects of social interaction and social capital. 
Meanwhile, scholars of the diffusion of innovations may find evidence to further embrace the complexity 
and interdependence of social interactions in their models and approaches. 
Key words: social networks, agricultural innovation, change agent, social capital, Bolivia    1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
For a long time, scholars in sociology have emphasized that people’s behavior is determined in part by 
their embeddedness in social networks. This knowledge is becoming increasingly used in the study of 
how farmers adopt innovations, complementing studies that have shown how innovation has diffused in 
rural communities based on a gradual process of diffusion dependent on resource endowments (land, 
credit, and farm inputs), economic incentives, and demographic and agro-ecological characteristics. The 
farmers’ position in social networks determines how they can access information on the use of knowledge 
and technology and complementary resources such as credit, land, and subsidized inputs that are 
important in innovation processes. Embeddedness in social networks also enables farmers to learn the 
best ways of applying new and improved knowledge and technology and to judge their usefulness and 
effects.  
Few empirical studies show (1) how resource-poor farmers in developing countries, based on 
their embeddedness in social networks, interact, exchange information, and—jointly with change agents 
promoting their use—learn how best to apply innovations and (2) how that interaction influences the level 
of adoption of new knowledge and technology. This paper expands on conceptual and methodological 
work in the study of innovation processes among farmers by providing empirical evidence from the 
analysis of social interaction among smallholders in impoverished areas in rural Bolivia, responding to 
the question of how interactions between farmers and promoters of innovation influence technology 
adoption. 
This paper reports on one of two complementary studies on adoption of technological innovation 
packages by smallholders involved in fish culture or the production of peanuts or quinoa in three Bolivian 
regions: the humid tropics, the valleys, and the altiplano. The study described here was an in-depth 
analysis of the effects of change agents (e.g., input sellers, buyers, extension agents, project staff, etc.) 
and social capital on the individual adoption decisions of farmers embedded in social networks. The 
second study (Hartwich et al., forthcoming) focuses on the incorporation of a range of networking 
parameters in various econometric models that explain the adoption of innovations of individual farmers 
on the basis of diverse variables depicting sociodemographic, economic, and agro-ecological conditions. 
Both studies were conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in collaboration 
with the Bolivian Agricultural Technology System (SIBTA), the Trópico Húmedo and the Valles 
Foundations for Agricultural Development, and the PROINPA Foundation.  
The two studies draw from information gathered from interviews with 360 farmers and 60 change 
agents and other actors involved in innovation networks in 12 microregions in Bolivia. In each region, a 
set of innovations related to one of the three sectors of fish culture, peanut production, or quinoa 
production has been advanced by a particular promoter of innovations, usually a nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) or project consultant agency. The data were analyzed with tools of social network 
analysis as well as correlation and multivariate regression analysis, testing a set of hypotheses on the 
effects of social influence, cohesion, brokerage, and equivalence on the farmers’ adoption of innovations 
both on the regional (network) level and individual (farmer) level. 
The paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 presents an extensive literature review of 
sociological and economic approaches to the study of innovation. Section 3 derives the hypotheses to be 
tested and describes research methods, data processing, and data analysis. Section 4 reveals the general 
features of interactions among agents found in the social networks underlying the innovation cases 
studied. Section 5 presents the results of testing the hypotheses. The paper concludes by pinpointing the 
overall findings and the policy implications that follow from them and presenting some reflections on 
challenges to the study of rural innovation and future topics of research. 
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2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
All innovation is social innovation. Innovation does not happen “out there” in the world 
of objects. . . . Innovation can properly be understood only by studying the social basis of 
innovation. (Tuomi 2002, 5–6). 
One key observation highlighted in many studies is the role of social links and community 
structure in the diffusion process. Communications and information relating to new 
knowledge were shown to be embedded within the more general fabric of social 
interactions among individuals. The pattern of information flows received and 
transmitted by individuals is thus related to their social environment, the network of their 
contacts, and their status within that network. (Feder and Savastano 2006, 1287) 
When using the term innovation, scholars from different fields of thought (e.g., Mahajan and 
Peterson 1985; Rogers 2003; Damanpour and Schneider 2006) refer to different concepts—such as ideas, 
practices, products, services, processes, technologies, policies, structures, and administrative systems—
that the adopting unit perceives as new. Perhaps most conveniently and broadly, an innovation is best 
understood as anything new successfully incorporated into social or economic processes.  
The spread of innovations across social groups over time is referred to as the diffusion of 
innovations (Brown 1981; Stoneman 2002). It is one of the most-studied and best-documented social 
phenomena in academic disciplines ranging from geography and sociology to economics, education, and 
marketing (Mahajan and Peterson 1985). The classic definition by Rogers (2003) considers diffusion as 
the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members 
of a social system. Diffusion can also be regarded as the cumulative pattern of individual adoption 
decisions in time—that is, the timing of individuals’ decisions about adopting, rejecting, or discontinuing 
an innovation within a social group. Adoption is commonly understood as the decision to make full use of 
an innovation, which encompasses the mental process that an individual undergoes from first hearing 
about to finally adopting an innovation (Feder et al. 1985; Rogers 2003). 
2.1. Diffusion of Agricultural Innovations: Early Approaches 
The study of the diffusion of innovations emerged as a prominent research field after the publication of a 
seminal work by Ryan and Gross (1943), two rural sociologists who analyzed the switch to hybrid corn 
seeds among farmers in two communities in Iowa, highlighting the importance of communication 
processes.  
In the light of this seminal study, early diffusion researchers were motivated to improve extension 
services and the marketing of new seeds and technology in the rural United States, given the lengthy 
periods then required for spreading even the most valuable innovations. Consequently, those scholars 
concentrated on identifying the key factors that constrained adoption decisions. According to Ruttan 
(2003), the practical insights obtained by early diffusion researchers (e.g., the recommendation to 
concentrate extension efforts on opinion leaders during the early stages of diffusion) led to the explosive 
expansion of this type of study by rural sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s. Several generalizations on 
the diffusion process—including the S-shaped pattern of cumulative adoption, the distinctions among 
various adopter categories according to their innovativeness (speed of adoption), and the phases that a 
farmer goes through before deciding to adopt—resulted from the evidence accumulated from those 
studies (cf., Beal et al. 1957; Copp 1958; Rogers 1958, 1962, 1976; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971). Those 
generalizations, in turn, gave rise to what is known as the classical diffusion model (Rogers 2003), which 
characterizes diffusion as a phenomenon of contagion or information spread among potential users; 
according to this model, all what was required for the occurrence of diffusion, in an almost automatic 
fashion, was that users could have access to information on innovations.   3
Early diffusion studies by rural sociologists put some emphasis on the sociopsychological factors 
determining individual adoption. Authors such as Ryan (1948), Gross (1949), Wilkening (1950a, 1950b, 
1952, 1954), Pedersen (1951), Gross and Taves (1952), Lionberger (1952, 1953), Marsh and Coleman 
(1955, 1956), and Hildebrand and Partenheimer (1958) stressed the significant role of differences in 
personality, education, and economic status on adoption behavior; others, like Fliegel and Kivlin (1962, 
1966a, 1966b), highlighted the effects of farmers’ perceptions about the attributes of innovations on 
adoption.  
Most of those early authors also emphasized the significant influence of structural factors, such as 
belonging to distinct neighborhoods or local or ethnic groups, on adoption decisions, given the social 
influence exerted by group values and norms (cf., Lionberger 1954; Marsh and Coleman 1954; Young 
and Coleman 1959; Van den Ban 1960; Coughenour 1964; Flinn 1970). Insights from these studies 
converged in the late 1960s with advances in diffusion studies conducted by (1) communication scholars, 
who recognized the limitations of the mass media in advancing diffusion and who stressed the role of 
human interaction in shaping the process, and (2) medical sociology researchers, who recognized social 
cohesion as a key determinant of the diffusion of new prescription drugs among physicians (Menzel and 
Katz 1955; Coleman et al. 1957, 1966; Katz et al. 1963; Ruttan 2001). As a result, studies on diffusion of 
innovations advanced toward a relational perspective that emphasizes the effects of sociostructural 
factors, explaining diffusion not only on the basis of individual attributes but also according to the 
relationships among the various actors involved in the process (see Lionberger and Copus 1972).  
2.2. Agricultural Innovation in Developing Countries 
The study of the diffusion of agricultural innovations in developing countries has been profoundly 
influenced by the works of Griliches (1957, 1960a, 1960b, 1962). In his reassessment of the diffusion of 
hybrid corn in the United States using econometric modeling, Griliches stated that the observed patterns 
of adoption timing were largely explained by the profitability of innovation to the individual farmer, 
generating heated controversies concerning the previous explanations purported by rural sociologists (cf., 
Brandner and Strauss 1959; Havens and Rogers 1961; Babcock 1962; Rogers and Havens 1962).  
Griliches’s perspective was soon taken up and furthered by analysts interested in boosting 
technological innovation in developing countries. The theoretical and empirical works that proliferated 
assumed that farmers behave as profit maximizers and considered the heterogeneity of attributes and 
resource endowments among individuals as the key determinant of diffusion patterns because of its effect 
on the utility of adoption for individuals. The likely effects of numerous factors on individual adoption 
were tested, deriving insights and policy recommendations that were basic for the design of most 
technological change efforts implemented as part of the Green Revolution and subsequent agricultural 
development programs (cf., Falcon 1970; Bell 1972; Perrin and Winkelmann 1976; Ruttan 1977; Feder et 
al. 1985; Feder and Umali 1993; Sunding and Zilberman 2001; Smale 2005). 
However, after 1970, the more relational approaches applied to the analysis of agricultural 
innovation processes were put aside by economists as well as rural sociologists. The latter concentrated 
their attention on issues such as the socioeconomic consequences of adoption or the adoption of 
conservation and organic practices (Rogers and Svenning 1969; Gotsch 1972; Havens and Flinn 1975; 
Röling et al. 1976; Pampel and Van Es 1977; Goss 1979; Shingi et al. 1981; Ashby 1982; Freeman et al. 
1982; Nowak 1987; Ruttan 1996, 2003; Fliegel and Korsching 2001). 
The dominance of individualistic and profit-maximizing approaches to agricultural innovation has 
not gone without critique and amendment. Rogers (1979, 2003), for example, criticized the 
“psychological bias” in diffusion research, citing its excessive focus on individuals as the unit of analysis 
and researchers’ tendency to hold individuals responsible for their own situations and problems. Smale, 
discussing the adoption of low external input agriculture, states that “the critical role of such factors as 
adaptation processes, information sources, social capital, externalities, and the slow payoff time from 
adoption, which characterize low external input technologies, are not easily addressed by such models” 
(2005, 1335). In fact, development practice has at times evidenced the occurrence of slow and partial   4
adoption irrespective of the profitability of the innovations at stake. This observation has been supported 
by theories on conservative and imitative behavior as a rational choice when facing uncertain outcomes 
(cf., Alchian 1950; Arrow and Fisher 1974). As a result, researchers have included learning effects in 
adoption models (cf., Hiebert 1974; Lindner et al. 1979; Feder and O’Mara 1982) usually understanding 
learning as a Bayesian process of updating individual beliefs triggered by personal experience and the 
experiences of others.  
A more explicit consideration of the relational perspective and the effects of social interactions in 
studies on the adoption of innovations in agriculture has been spurred in recent years as a consequence of 
paradigmatic shifts that have been under way since the 1970s both in economics and the study of 
innovation in business and in advanced economies. On the one hand, the scope of economics as a 
discipline has been widened by considering nonmarket interactions, their structure, and their 
externalities—a phenomenon largely derived from the emergence of noncooperative game theory, the 
consideration of household perspectives in labor economics, and the emergence of endogenous growth 
theory in macroeconomics (cf., Akerlof 1997; Akerlof and Kranton 2000 Barr 2000; Manski 2000; Brock 
and Durlauf 2001; Durlauf 2001, 2004; DeMarzo et al. 2003; Jackson 2007a, 2007b).  
On the other hand, evolutionary approaches that understand innovation as a disequilibrium 
process which entails uncertainty -its advance cannot be predicted as it depends on the competition 
among diverse technological options (cf., Silverberg et al. 1988; Ruttan 1997; Sharif 2006)- have 
enriched the theory and empirical analysis of technical change and innovation by highlighting the role of 
institutional structures and settings (e.g., innovation systems) in supporting and shaping efforts to advance 
technology (Lundvall et al. 2002; Nelson and Nelson 2002). The innovation systems concept—that is, 
“the network of organizations, enterprises and individuals focused on bringing new products, new 
processes and new forms of organization into social and economic use, together with the institutions and 
policies that affect their behavior and performance” (World Bank 2007, xiv)—is a key concept in these 
evolutionary approaches and highlights the interactive, systemic, and dynamic nature of innovation; it has 
become a basic framework for understanding and promoting agricultural innovation (Hall et al. 2005; 
Spielman 2006).
1 
The impetus of this multipronged reconsideration of social interactions in economics and other 
fields has permeated into adoption studies in agriculture, where an increasing number of scholars are 
pursuing a deeper understanding of the social processes affecting adoption decisions. The major advances 
to date can be grouped into three main areas: 
•  Numerous authors have used learning models to test the effects of social interactions, 
continuously refining the specification of social learning effects (cf., Besley and Case 1994; 
Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Pomp and Burger 1995; Fischer et al. 1996; Cameron 1999; 
Henrich 2001; Marra et al. 2003; Hinrichs et al. 2004; Abadi Ghadim et al. 2005; Munshi 
2005; Alene and Manyong 2006). In some cases, these models build on Bayesian approaches 
but go beyond the assumption that farmers access freely the outcomes of their experimenting 
neighbors and that information quality is not lost in the process, considering learning in the 
framework of social networks (e.g., Conley and Udry 2001, 2004; Bandiera and Rasul 2006). 
•  Contagion models have frequently been used in the study of diffusion in economic geography 
and marketing, and some authors have used them to demonstrate the influence of physical 
proximity among actors on their adoption behavior (e.g., Abdulai and Huffman 2005), 
considering at times social network parameters (e.g., Nyblom et al. 2003). 
•  Diverse models consider various effects attributed to social interactions, such as the 
conformity pressures exerted on individuals’ behavior by social contacts, reference groups, 
                                                      
 
1 Jarrett (1985) and Biggs (1990) are early examples of how an innovation systems perspective had already been introduced 
in agricultural innovation studies.    5
and social structures; the role of opinion leaders; and the effect of social capital (e.g., 
Warriner and Moul 1992; Boahene et al. 1999; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Isham 2002; 
Caviglia-Harris 2003; Jagger and Pender 2003; Nyangena 2004; Sapp and Korsching 2004; 
Feder and Savastano 2006; Hogset 2006; Katungi 2006; Moser and Barrett 2006; Moxley and 
Lang 2006; Van den Broeck and Dercon 2007). 
Laudable as they are, these pioneering efforts have also been subjected to numerous criticisms 
derived from the challenge of combining very diverse traditions and analytical frameworks. Obstacles for 
an adequate formulation of a model include the abundance of subjectively formalized concepts in the 
sociological tradition (of which social capital is a good example); the endogeneity problem of the 
observed effects of interaction; and the simplistic specification of social interactions and peer effects in 
econometric models (Manski 2000; Jackson and Yariv 2005). To Manski, Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) is a very promising approach for sorting these obstacles, though its potential has not been realized.  
2.3. Adoption of Innovations and Social Interactions 
This section provides a review of the most fundamental concepts and perspectives regarding the effects of 
social interactions on the diffusion of innovations in agriculture and other fields. These perspectives 
represent diverse disciplinary origins (e.g., economics, sociology, organizational studies, and agricultural 
extension) and are related to distinct approaches within the literature of social learning, social capital, and 
social influence that are only partly known and applied in agricultural economics and sociology. 
Particular emphasis is placed here on structural parameters that can be derived at the level of individuals 
rather than groups or farming communities, thus being amenable for their inclusion in econometric 
models as attributes describing the position of individuals in the social structure. This review is 
instrumental in leading to the formulation of the hypotheses tested in the present study. 
2.3.1. Economic Perspectives 
Development economics often takes the standpoint that social interaction determines to a certain degree 
the adoption of innovations because it provides access to information, inputs, infrastructure, and 
institutions (e.g., risk-sharing and coordination mechanisms), all of which are considered important 
factors contributing to the implementation of innovative ideas (Chwe 2000; Kranton and Minehart 2001; 
Okten and Osili 2004; Hogset 2006; Fafchamps 2007; Van den Broeck and Dercon 2007).  
The effects of interactions on information exchange and learning has always been the topic of 
preference among development economists (Young 2002, 2005). According to Zhao (2005), access to 
information about innovations is the key factor affecting the dynamics of adoption processes. Authors like 
Feder and Slade (1984), Feder et al. (1985), and Abadi Ghadim et al. (2005) have demonstrated that, for 
profitable innovations, the accumulation of experience and learning eventually induce farmers to adopt 
innovations as (1) initial beliefs about their characteristics are updated; (2) their utilization gets 
increasingly efficient, thus increasing the probabilities of deriving higher payoffs; and (3) the 
uncertainties about their performance decrease as knowledge improves.  
Farmers can access information through various sources and mechanisms, such as visits from 
extension agents, participation in training activities, and exposure to mass media. Learning has been 
acknowledged as another key source of information for farmers, and one that is fundamental for 
promoting adoption under uncertain conditions because it helps to modify the perceived risk of 
innovations (cf., Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2005; Yamauchi 2007). Abadi Gadhim et al. 
(2005), for example, posit that farmers’ perceptions of innovation risk and farmers’ risk aversion are the 
most important of all variables influencing the level (intensity) of adoption. Feder et al. (1985), based on 
their summary of empirical studies considering the effects of risk and uncertainty on adoption, 
hypothesize that exposure to appropriate information through a range of communication channels reduces   6
subjective uncertainty. The consequent reduced uncertainty should lead to increased adoption, assuming 
all other factors remain unchanged.  
Indeed, abundant empirical evidence shows that farmers get involved in diverse learning 
processes, either by experimenting in their own plots before full adoption (learning by doing) or by 
actively or passively taking advantage of the experiences and performance of neighbors, friends, and 
relatives who have experimented with the innovation (learning from others, learning spillovers, or social 
learning). Empirical studies in agriculture,
2 as well as in other economic activities,
3 have consistently 
found that social learning processes predict localized conformity effects (i.e., contagion by physical 
proximity and direct interaction).  
2.3.2. Organizational Science Perspectives 
DiMaggio and Powell studied the phenomenon of isomorphic change in organizations, by which “rational 
actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them” (1983, 147). They 
propose the existence of three isomorphic processes: (1) coercive processes, which result from formal and 
informal external pressures applied through a diversity of mechanisms, such as group norms, expectations 
of compliance, invitations to collude, persuasive messages, and overt force; (2) mimetic processes, in 
which imitation of the more legitimate or successful examples in the field is utilized as a viable and 
inexpensive alternative to facing uncertainty, especially in the case of complex technological change or 
ambiguous problems, goals, and contexts; and (3) normative processes, which result from the impulse to 
standardize methods and procedures in the distinct occupational fields as a means of enhancing the 
exchange of information and increasing effectiveness. Building on those processes, DiMaggio and Powell 
suggest a set of predictors of isomorphic change that has been used in the analysis of the adoption of 
innovations. This analytical framework has been further developed by several scholars in organizational 
science to analyze the diffusion of organizational innovations, considering innovation as a social 
contagion process (Haveman 1993; Mizruchi and Fein 1999). For our analysis of agricultural innovation 
processes among smallholders, the relevant hypothesis that can be derived from this field is that one actor 
(organization) ends up imitating the behavior of those he or she depends on more strongly or perceives as 
successful.  
2.3.3. Sociopsychological Perspectives 
Scholars in the field of social psychology argue that interactions not only influence the acquisition of 
information but also enable individuals to learn about social norms and influence others’ attitudes and 
behaviors (Kohler et al. 2007). Social psychologists argue that attitude formation is largely a process of 
comparison against similar others; because this process has little effect among strangers, it occurs largely 
within the boundaries of social communities and networks. Within a social network, the effects of 
interpersonal processes depend both on the characteristics of the relationships and on where those 
relationships fit into the structure of the network. Interpersonal processes vary with the kind of larger 
structural unit (network) within which individual ties are embedded (Erickson 1988). 
                                                      
 
2 See, for example, Feder et al. (1985), Besley and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Pomp and Burger (1995), 
Conley and Udry (2001), Marra et al. (2003), Abadi Ghadim et al. (2005), Munshi (2005), Bandiera and Rasul (2006), Doss 
(2006), and Yamauchi (2007). 
3 See, for example, Ellison (1993), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), Kapur (1995), Bikhchandani et al. (1998), Bala and 
Goyal (1998), DeMarzo et al. (2003), Choi et al. (2005), and Young (2007). The social learning approach is closely related to the 
literature on bandwagons, information cascades, and herd behavior (e.g., Banerjee 1992; Banerjee and Fudenberg 2004; 
Bikhchandani et al. 1998; Ellison and Fudenberg 2001; Gale and Kariv 2003; and Neill 2005), which discusses how, in situations 
of incomplete information and uncertainty, mimetic behavior and herding may represent rational options.   7
2.3.4. Social Capital and Collective Action Perspectives 
The opinions among scholars on the meaning, content, and economic consequences of social capital are 
very diverse.
4 One broad division can be traced between scholars who consider social capital an aggregate 
characteristic of social groups and those who believe it is an individual trait derived from social 
interactions (Borgatti et al. 1998). Here the emphasis is on studies related to the group-level notion of 
social capital. Studies centered on the individual perspective—also called social network capital (e.g., 
Fafchamps and Minten 2002; Mouw 2006; Chantarat and Barrett 2007)—pay more attention to the effects 
of network structure on behavioral and economic outcomes (cf., Sobel 2002; Granovetter 2005; Jackson 
2006); they are discussed further in Section 2.3.5. 
Many studies on social capital focus on the influence of trust on various organizational outcomes. 
A review of this literature by Dirks and Ferrin (2001) found that trust is significantly and positively 
associated with innovation in empirical works on topics such as the accuracy of information shared with 
superiors in vertical relations, the openness in intra- and inter-organizational communication, the 
performance of collaborative tasks, support for leaders, and the perceptions relative to the changes and 
innovations proposed by leaders. 
Works on social capital and collective action by Flora and Flora (1993), Flora et al. (1997), Flora 
et al. (2004), and Emery and Flora (2006) assess the effects of collective action on change processes. To 
these authors, investing in more connections among organizations and groups (“bonding” social capital) 
and in more links to external organizations and technical support agencies (“bridging” social capital) is 
fundamental to promoting change and innovation in rural areas. 
Various scholars have considered social capital as a determinant of the adoption of innovations. 
For example, Barr (2000) defines social capital in terms of network density and found that entrepreneurs 
within the manufacturing sector with larger and more diverse sets of contacts have more productive 
enterprises.
5 In agriculture, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) found greater use of modern agricultural inputs 
among households from villages with larger social capital indexes. These researchers found that social 
capital, measured as the quantity and quality of villagers’ participation in farmers’ organizations, 
facilitated the diffusion of innovations both directly, in response to more linkages among individuals, and 
indirectly, by reducing uncertainty about alters’ compliance in adoption-related transactions. The latter 
effect was attributed to improved flows of information, tighter enforcement mechanisms, and the informal 
insurance role of social capital. Nyangena (2004) found evidence of increasing adoption of conservation 
practices in response to trust and increased group activity, both variables commonly used as indicators of 
social capital. Katungi (2006) and Katungi et al. (2006) found that social capital is a key factor in 
information exchange and that compared with women, men generally have better access to social capital 
and consequently to information on innovations. 
The concepts of social capital and collective action are highly interrelated. Some authors argue 
that social capital refers to the structure of social relationships and that collective action refers to the 
flows of those interactions. Social capital (i.e., social cohesion, shared norms and values, and trust among 
members) facilitates collective action, and collective action helps building additional social capital 
(Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004). Numerous scholars,
6 under the CGIAR systemwide program on collective 
action and property rights (CAPRi), have dealt with the adoption of innovations as a form of collective 
action, which is very often the case for adoption of sustainable agriculture and natural resource 
management innovative practices. The analytical framework used by members of the CAPRi program 
differentiates innovations according to the degree of collective action and the degree of tenure security 
                                                      
 
4 See, for example, Coleman (1988), Flora (1998), Woolcock (1998), Falk and Kilpatrick (2000), Fafchamps and Minten 
(2002), Agnitsh et al. (2006), Fafchamps (2006), and the collaborative volumes edited by Serageldin and Dasgupta (2001) and 
Atria (2004). 
5 Additional authors in fields other than agriculture include Fountain (2000), Maskell (2000), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (2000), 
Patton and Kenney (2003), Frank et al. (2004), Ruuskanen (2004), and Upadhyayula and Kumar (2004). 
6 See, for example, Knox et al. (1998), Ravnborg et al. (2000), Swallow (2000), Pender and Scherr (2002), and Dévaux et al. 
(2007).   8
required for adoption, as well as according to the spatial and temporal scale required to reap the benefits 
of adoption (Knox et al. 1998).  
Collective action, expressed as joint investment, building or maintenance of infrastructure and 
equipment, or regulations generated and enforced for the management and exploitation of common 
resources, or even more commonly as the simple sharing of information, may be an important factor 
directly limiting the degree of adoption of innovations. More often, however, collective action has an 
indirect effect on adoption through its interaction with other determining factors. For example, collective 
action can reinforce the negotiation power of otherwise marginalized groups and improve their access to 
information; it can even be employed to oppose or modify the characteristics of promoted innovations. 
The formation of networks and other forms of collective action can facilitate the coordination efforts 
required for adoption. Collective action—expressed, for example, through reciprocity norms—can also 
emerge as a risk-sharing and mutual help mechanism to cope with labor shortages as well as with the food 
insecurity, environmental, and price risks associated with innovations. In addition, collective action can 
facilitate the adoption of innovations requiring indivisible investments, thus reducing the restrictions on 
participation of the resource poor. Finally, nontraditional microfinancing institutions have facilitated 
access to credit to the poor through group loans or by requiring collective action as a form of collateral 
(Knox et al. 1998).  
2.3.5. Social Network Perspectives 
In 1981, Rogers and Kincaid asserted that “the essence of the diffusion of an innovation is the human 
interaction through which one individual communicates a new idea to one or more other individuals. . . . 
As these interpersonal communication flows become patterned over time, a communication structure 
emerges and is predictive of behavior” (229). To Rogers (2003), a turning point in diffusion studies came 
with a series of publications on the “epidemiology” of a new drug among physicians, which made use of 
sociometric data (Menzel and Katz 1955; Coleman et al. 1957, 1966); they found that the more connected 
doctors, along with fellow physicians at the center of their friendship networks, were the first to prescribe 
an innovative medical treatment.  
Since those studies, many analyses of social networks have been conducted to describe the 
process of diffusion of information and innovations in numerous fields, including marketing, 
organizational studies, industrial development, and medical sociology.
7 In addition, applications of social 
network analysis to the analysis of other contagion (imitation) processes further inform the study of the 
diffusion of innovations.
8 However, direct applications of social network analysis to study the diffusion of 
innovations in agriculture have been more limited.  
Understanding of the concept of social network analysis varies widely.
9 In a commonly accepted 
definition (Marsden and Lin 1982; Wasserman and Faust 1994), social network analysis is characterized 
as a “perspective” or “approach” that considers interactions among social actors and the regular patterns 
of those interactions (i.e., social structures), at the core of its inquire endeavors. Network analysis 
considers all human actors as participating in a social system composed of many actors who serve as 
                                                      
 
7 See, for example, Reingen and Kernan (1986) and Brown and Reingen (1987) for marketing; Tushman (1977), Rice and 
Aydin (1991), Burns and Wholey (1993), Westphal et al. (1997), Hansen (1999), Ahuja (2000), McGrath and Krackhardt (2003), 
Reagans and McEvily (2003), Gibbons (2004), Obstfeld (2005) and Zhou and Delios (2006), as well as the reviews by Borgatti 
and Foster (2003) and Brass et al. (2004), for organizational studies; Harkola and Greve (1995) and Sorenson et al. (2006), for 
industrial development; and Rogers (1979), Burt (1987), Strang and Tuma (1993), Rosero-Bixby and Casterline (1994), Valente 
(1995, 2005), Montgomery and Casterline (1996), Kohler (1997), Valente et al. (1997), Valente and Saba (1998), Kincaid (2000), 
Van den Bulte and Lillien (2001), and Kohler et al. (2007) for medical sociology. 
8 See, for example, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989), Mizruchi (1990), Davis (1991), Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991), 
Haunschild and Miner (1997), Haunschild and Beckman (1998), Kraatz (1998), Hëdstrom et al. (2000), Still and Strang (2007).  
9 Concepts of social network analysis range from “analytic paradigm” (Leinhardt 1977), “intellectual tool” (Wellman and 
Berkowitz 1988), “methodological tool” (De Nooy et al. 2005), and “set of methods” (Dagenne and Forsé 1999) for the 
systematic study of social structure, to simply a “collection of quantifying tools to graph social structures in the economy” 
(Smith-Doerr 2006).   9
reference points for each other’s decision making. The nature of the relationships in the network impinges 
on the focal actor’s perceptions, beliefs, and actions (Borgatti and Foster 2003), the organization of those 
relationships reveals the social structure within which the focal actor is embedded, and analyzing that 
organization allows for detecting emerging social phenomena often unperceived at the individual actor 
level (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982). 
According to Kohler et al. (2007) and Hogset (2005), social networks affect the diffusion of 
innovations through social learning, joint evaluation, social influence, and collective action processes. 
Through social learning, people learn about an innovation’s existence and characteristics and take 
advantage of alters’ experiences to lower uncertainties related to adoption. Joint evaluation allows 
network members to reinterpret and moderate risky innovations to make them more realistic and 
meaningful in the local context. Social influence accounts for the enforcement of social norms and the 
effects of prevailing opinions and attitudes on individuals’ preferences and behavior.
10 Finally, networks 
act as devices for resolving externalities and coordination problems for collective action.  
Most diffusion studies carried out by social network analysts have approached diffusion as a 
homogenizing communication process by which individual attitudes and behavior are influenced toward 
agreement by the social microstructure (Wejnert 2002). Network influences on behavior are categorized 
by Burt et al. (1994) into four broad classes of hypotheses: 
•  Inequality hypotheses explain why some actors obtain more rewards from their participation 
in a network. Exchange theory posits that interdependent interests and differential positions 
within a system make certain actors powerful. On the other hand, social network capital or 
structural holes theory asserts that missing connections in a network create competitive 
advantages for players positioned as brokers. 
•  Embedding hypotheses explain the occurrence of “unexpected results” (in the sense of 
economic considerations) in transactions embedded in social networks. Elements of resource 
dependence, social identity, and transaction costs theories are used to describe the creation 
and functioning of the institutions and identities required to manage those economically 
irrational relationships.  
•  Contingency hypotheses describe how similar processes can generate distinct outcomes as a 
result of an actor’s position in the network structure. The actor’s position is defined by the 
direct and indirect relationships the actor maintains with other types of actors in the network. 
•  Contagion hypotheses describe how network structures bring actors together, making the 
ideas and behaviors of some contagious to others who are either emotionally close (cohesion 
theories) or taken as referents in the surrounding context (equivalence theories). 
Contagion hypotheses have dominated the study of the diffusion of innovations within the social 
networks perspective. Contagion is described as a phenomenon led by physical or social proximity 
factors; according to Valente (1995, 11-12), contagion is “the specific process of innovation diffusion” by 
which individuals monitor others and imitate their behavior to adopt (or not) innovations. It is also called 
the “diffusion effect” (Rogers 2003) or the “majority rule” effect (Valente 2005).  
Contagion occurs through cohesion (direct ties, affective proximity), structural equivalence 
(comparitors, social proximity), popularity (opinion leaders, centrality), bridges to distant sources (weak 
ties or information brokers), or spatial proximity. Consequently, social network analysts have generated 
                                                      
 
10 Dagenne and Forsé (1999), for example, indicate that in traditional rural communities, communications occur through a 
tight network of contacts that are affective (kin, friends, and neighbors) or normative (local institutions and hierarchies) in a 
context that gives preeminence to security, continuity, and tradition. Thus, innovation faces prejudice from the outset.   10
various models to predict the effects of network structure on attitude agreement among people tied by 
distinct relationships and occupying different structural locations:
11 
•  Cohesion: Direct interactions between individuals—especially in cohesive subgroups—
accounts for adoption of numerous innovations. Cliques, or densely knit subgroups, contain 
many of the preferred comparitors of focal actor and generate a sense of belonging in their 
members that imposes on them more pressure to conform to internally accepted attitudes and 
behavior. Because of both effects (comparison and conformity pressures), the greater the 
density (or reachability) within the subgroup, the stronger the influence and the greater the 
expected similarity among its members. Strong (homophilous) ties, which characterize 
cohesive relations, are key for the intranetwork diffusion (especially for diffusing tacit 
knowledge, which is characteristic of complex technological innovations) because of their 
relevant role in processes of social influence, comparison and learning process.
12 The most 
common variables predicting adoption are inversely related to network size and directly 
related to network density. Frequency of interactions among members is also often used.  
•  Equivalence: For authors like Burt (1987), competition among people of similar status (i.e., 
people with similar reference groups and structural position) is the driving force of contagion. 
People with ties to the same or similar types of people tend to behave similarly, even if they 
are not connected to each other. The greater the regular equivalence of two actors, the greater 
the expected similarity in their behavior (Borgatti and Everett 1992). According to Wejnert 
(2002), equivalence among individuals is determined by demographic factors (sex, age, race, 
marital attributes), social factors (education, occupation), and cultural factors (language, 
tradition, religion, values, norms). Bothner (2003) found that small firms are most affected by 
innovation decisions of their competitors, especially if they are diversified across market 
segments. 
•  Bridges and brokers: Weak heterophilous ties are fundamental in the early diffusion of new 
ideas and behaviors because they provide local bridges to otherwise disconnected parts of the 
whole network, as well as links to nonredundant external sources of information (Liu and 
Duff 1972; Granovetter 1973, 1982; Hansen 1999; Levin and Cross 2004). Burt (1992, 2005) 
revised Granovetter’s hypothesis on the “strength of weak ties” and suggested that, rather 
than relying on the weakness of the tie, the strength relies on the bridging function of the 
actors. Those actors span the “structural holes” of the network by acting as brokers of 
information among distinct subgroups. Because of their distinct role in the network, such 
brokers can also become early adopters. The positional advantages these brokers enjoy 
constitute their social capital or social network capital. 
•  Prestige: Prominent and well-connected members (those with high centrality in the network—
that is, those tied to many others, or to many events in affiliation networks), often called “opinion 
leaders” (Weiman, 1991) are usually early adopters of innovations that are consistent with group 
norms (cf. Borgatti and Everett 1997; Faust 1997, Borgatti 2005). Meanwhile, marginalized and 
disconnected network members are less affected by others’ judgments on their attitudes and 
                                                      
 
11 See, for example, Burt (1978, 1980, 1982, 1987, 2005); Friedkin (1984, 1998, 1999); Erickson (1988); Michaelson and 
Contractor (1992); Mizruchi (1993); Marsden and Friedkin (1994); Harkola and Greve (1995); Friedkin and Johanssen (1997); 
Valente (1996, 2005); Strang and Soule (1998); and Wejnert (2002). 
12 On homophily effects, authors like Brass et al. (2004) and McPherson et al. (2001) indicate that diffusion is boosted 
among actors with similar social, organizational, and strategic characteristics, because people perceive it is easier and more 
relevant to learn from those in similar conditions. Nevertheless, homophily can also operate to resist adoption; that is the reason 
why diffusion requires a certain level of heterophily (and weak links) for information to flow among subgroups (Gatignon and 
Robertson 1985; Dagenne and Forsé 1999). That is a relevant issue for assessing the role of opinion leaders (Feder and Savastano 
2006).   11
behavior and thus are more likely to adopt innovations that are not consistent with group values 
and norms (Becker 1970; Rogers 2003). Prestige explanations account for contagion through 
unreciprocated relations: lower-ranking members might be motivated to adopt because they 
aspire to resemble powerful leaders; and adoption by central actors can shift locally accepted 
patterns, dragging the others with them into adoption.  
•  Spatial proximity: Contagion among spatially proximate actors is one of the most common 
findings in diffusion research. Geographic proximity facilitates various types of interaction 
and influence processes; aside from sociometric data, physical location data have good 
predictive power for adoption patterns. These models assume that network members are 
distributed in a social space in such a way that spatial closeness corresponds to closeness of 
relationship. The closer two people are, or the more strongly tied they are, the more likely 
they are to have similar sets of comparitors and thus similar attitudes. For some topics, 
attitude similarity declines rapidly with spatial distance; for other topics, social comparison 
includes weaker ties, and thus similarity declines more slowly with distance. Spatial 
proximity models are very restrictive because they imply no asymmetry and intransitivity or 
subgroups in network relations. Nyblom et al. (2003) and Udry and Conley (2005) present 
applications of spatial models to diffusion of agricultural innovations. 
Beyond those general models, network effects on attitudes and behavior (adoption) can also be 
predicted considering various levels of structural analysis, with parameters at the node (individual) level 
as well as the dyad, triad,
13 subgroup, and network levels (cf., Buskens and Yamaguchi 1999; Monge and 
Contractor 2003; Contractor et al. 2006).  
At the individual level, nodes with higher centrality measures are opinion leaders. They tend to be 
early adopters of culturally acceptable innovations and generally are opponents of culturally unacceptable 
ones (Becker 1970).  
At the dyad level, attitude and behavior are affected by the following: 
•  Frequency of interaction: The more frequent the interaction, the more chances that both 
parties will learn to interpret each other’s attitudes accurately. 
•  Multiplexity of interaction: The more kinds of positive relationships the members of a dyad 
share, the more widely they agree.  
•  Strength of interaction: Stronger ties (on a positive relation) lead to stronger agreement 
between dyad members compared with weakly tied and unconnected nodes. Conversely, a 
negative tie may prevent social comparison or induce disagreement. 
•  Asymmetry of interaction: In authority-based relations, it may prevent comparison or provoke 
disagreement; in esteem-based relations, subordinates may take superiors as reference or 
model (Erickson 1988; Sparrowe and Liden 1997, 2005). 
At the triad level, structural balance and transitivity concepts (Wasserman and Faust 1994), based 
on early cognitive balance concepts (Heider 1946), have been used to predict similarity based on the mere 
stability of structures (for valued, directed graphs). These forces imply that, in a triad structure, a 
nonadopter tied to two adopters will end up adopting. Krackhardt (1998, 1999), Krackhardt and Kilduff 
(2002), and Dekker (2006) indicate that Simmelian-tied dyads (i.e., dyads embedded in three-person 
cliques) reach higher agreement relative to dyads in general. Extending these arguments, it can be 
hypothesized that someone tied to two intense adopters, or someone tied to two promoters of an 
                                                      
 
13 A dyad is a set of two actors (nodes) and the interactions between them. A triad is a set of three actors (nodes) and the 
interactions between them.   12
innovation that are themselves strongly tied to each other, will end up adopting more intensively than 
predicted from a merely dyadic perspective.  
Finally, at the network level, centralized structures (e.g. core–periphery structures characterized 
by high centralization parameters) are likely to accelerate the pace of diffusion as soon as the diffusing 
element—information, knowledge, or technological innovations—reaches the core actors in the network, 
such as opinion leaders (Rogers 2003). Social network analysis at this level provides objective measures 
and specific predictions on the effects of aggregate network structure, which is applicable to assessing 
regional differences in adoption diffusion.
14 The effects of location-specific networks can also be tested 
considering different innovations and activities. Isham (2002) indicates three characteristics of social 
structures that promote a more rapid diffusion: (1) group homogeneity, which is the degree of similarity in 
certain attributes and beliefs between interacting individuals; (2) participatory norms, which describe the 
degree to which local customs promote communication and interactive decision making; and (3) 
leadership heterogeneity, which is the degree to which leaders within the network differ in certain social 
and economic attributes or contacts across social subsystems.  
2.3.6. Rural Communication and Extension Perspectives 
Influence of other farmers.  According to Feder and Slade (1985), the dynamics of diffusion processes 
depend mostly on horizontal communication among farmers. Adoption is strongly influenced by members 
of the same social group. New ideas are more easily adopted when they come from others who are similar 
in several respects. Outsiders are not entirely trusted, especially in conservative locations. Farmers then 
monitor and have a perception of other farmers’ experiences and performance, and they learn from 
discussing their own experiences with friends and neighbors.  
However, kin, friends, and neighbors generally have access to the same innovations as the focal 
farmer. Consequently, farmers often resort to more-vertical communications to gain access to 
innovations. Opinion leaders, who are also local farmers, are sufficiently heterophilous to be good sources 
of new information and advice. They usually enjoy considerable influence on the way other locals think 
and behave (Fliegel and Korsching 2001; Rogers 2003). 
Opinion leadership is not a characteristic applicable under all conditions of rural innovation. 
Some farmers might be opinion leaders in a wider context, and others might have leadership roles 
restricted to specific issues. Opinion leaders for midsize farms under certain conditions can be useless for 
smaller operations or under other conditions, and social interaction among those groups can be limited. 
Separate communication networks might also exist for men and women, thus limiting the flows from 
opinion leaders from one sex to farmers of the other sex (Van den Ban and Hawkins 1996; Rogers 2003; 
Feder and Savastano 2006).  
Information and advice are not the only aspects that flow through horizontal and vertical 
communications among farmers. Mayfield and Yapa (1974), for example, describe the existence of 
horizontal and vertical communication ties in rural India, indicating that the vertical flow was 
characteristic for the direction of influence and authority; this type of interaction was tempered by the 
social interaction induced by obligatory intercaste reciprocity and attendance at village gatherings, which 
produced a more homogeneous mix of information flow. 
Information and influence are also communicated among farmers within organizational settings. 
Jagger and Pender (2003), for example, analyzed farmers’ participation in different types of organizations 
as a determinant of the adoption of different kinds of innovations. The effects were generally positive but 
contingent on the type of organization and innovation considered.  
                                                      
 
14 Differences in adoption behavior among regions are seldom tested in econometric studies because the differences include 
not only agro-ecological variations but also differences in factors not related to agricultural potential, such as infrastructure, 
access to markets for inputs and outputs, and institutional and sociocultural factors (Doss 2006). Location effects are generally 
modeled as dummy variables, without specific hypotheses on their likely effects and lacking objective measures to account for 
such effects.   13
Influence of external change agents.  Frambach (1993) asserts that despite recognizing the relevance of 
supply-side factors in explaining the adoption of innovations, diffusion theory and research have too often 
taken an adopter-side perspective, ignoring the influence of the supplier on diffusion. Even scholars 
specifically interested in social interactions as drivers of diffusion have generally omitted innovation 
suppliers (change agents) in their models, as if the only relevant interactions were those existing among 
farmers. Such omissions and simplifications can lead to misleading interpretations.
15 
This observation suggests the need for assessing the role played by all types of actors interacting 
in innovation diffusion processes, particularly change agents active at the local level. This is reminiscent 
of the central arguments posited by innovation system scholars who highlight the active role played by 
public and private providers of information and technical advice, input sellers, product buyers, and other 
external agents in the network of interactions within those systems. Those “external” actors are in 
frequent contact with each other and with “local” actors of the system, thus impinging on farmers’ 
attitudes and behavior. 
Rogers defines a change agent as “an individual who influences clients’ innovation decision in a 
direction deemed desirable by a change agency” (2003, 473). According to this definition, change agents 
are external actors of an organizational origin. The classic diffusion literature in agriculture uses the term 
change agent as almost synonymous with extension agent. Nonetheless, change agent can be applied to 
the wider variety of actors approaching farmers to promote adoption of specific innovations (e.g., input 
sellers) and those providing farmers with or giving them access to information and inputs that are 
fundamental determinants of adoption (e.g., credit providers or product buyers who inform farmers on 
market requirements). 
Farmers’ interactions with change agents can be described as unbalanced: almost vertical in terms 
of the status and information endowments of the concurrent actors and almost unidirectional given its 
explicitly persuasive nature. The vertical and persuasive nature of this interaction is in part responsible for 
the impersonal treatment that has characterized the analysis of change agents’ influence in diffusion 
processes.
16 Most early studies conducted by rural sociologists treated farmers’ contacts with extension 
agents as equivalent to their contacts with the mass media, considering both indifferently as the effect of 
“external information sources.” Only a few researchers characterized this relationship as falling between 
interpersonal communication and access to the mass media.
17 Subsequently, most diffusion studies in 
agriculture, both by sociologists
18 and economists,
19 have regularly included farmers’ interactions with 
                                                      
 
15 An example of the consequences of omitting the supply side is provided by Van den Bulte and Lillien (2001) who 
reanalyzed the classical study of diffusion of a medical drug among physicians by Coleman et al. (1966), showing that most of 
the effects originally attributed to social interactions became insignificant once the marketing efforts of innovation suppliers were 
taken into account. In fact, marketing variables accounted for most of the observed adoption patterns. 
16 Vertical interactions have been addressed with an explicit consideration of the characteristics of the interacting actors in 
organizational studies by the leader–member exchange perspective and other related approaches (Liden and Graen 1980; Newell 
and Swan 1995; Sparrowe and Liden 1997, 2005), which consider the downward movement of information in organizations and 
its positive effects on innovation processes, as well as intra-organizational leader–subordinate dyads and the determinant effects 
of those vertical interactions on subordinates’ performance (influence, career evolution, innovation involvement). However, those 
perspectives are only partially useful in understanding the change agent–farmer relationship because they apply to intra-
organizational settings where members are subject to formal hierarchical ties. In those situations, especially if the organization is 
centralized and highly stratified, leaders can resort to coercive pressure (via explicit or implicit rewards or negative 
contingencies) to achieve conformity of practices, homogeneity of behavior, and increased adoption rates. In contrast, change 
agent–farmer interactions take place in a wider context, where farmers are not obliged to participate but rather are persuaded or 
induced to do so. 
17 Among those researchers, Menzel (1971) called the contact with change agents “quasi-mass communication,” while Lin 
and Burt (1975) called it “local media communication.” 
18 See, for example, Coleman (1951), Fliegel (1956), Wilkening (1956), Rogers and Beal (1958), Copp et al. (1958). 
Lindstrom (1958), Coughenour (1960), Photiadis (1962), Polgar et al. (1963), Kivlin and Fliegel (1967), Lin and Burt (1975), 
Opare (1977), Hooks et al. (1983), Thomas et al. (1990), Saltiel et al. (1994), Fliegel and Korsching (2001), Glendinning et al. 
(2001), Lasley et al. (2001), and Mitchell (2006).  
19 See, for example, Huffman (1978); Lockheed et al. (1980); Feder and Slade (1984, 1986a, 1986b); Feder et al. (1987); 
Harper et al. (1990); Longo (1990); Birkhaeuser et al. (1991); Strauss et al. (1991); Hussain et al. (1994); Wadsworth (1995);   14
extension agents among the set of explanatory variables for adoption but have considered only the 
existence or frequency of such interactions. In most cases, those studies have found that it is a significant 
factor positively affecting adoption timing and intensity.  
However, interpersonal communication and influence processes are at play here as in every other 
human interaction. Rogers’ theoretical contribution in this area (2003) was exceptional, because he 
discussed how a series of individual traits of change agents were likely to affect their effectiveness and 
performance.
20 More recently, Moser and Barrett (2006) gathered empirical evidence of how social 
conformity pressures (i.e., the nonpecuniary incentives for farmers to conform their behavior to that of 
their neighbors or to the wishes of people in positions of influence and power) included the personal 
influence of extension agents and played a significant role in the adoption decisions and use patterns of 
innovations among Malagasy rice farmers. 
Another factor that has limited a more detailed assessment of the specific effects of change 
agent–farmer interactions on diffusion is one of the basic generalizations derived from early diffusion 
studies, according to which external sources are basically relevant to spreading information about 
innovations at the earlier stages of diffusion. According to this argument, those interactions would be 
relevant mostly for persuading the minority of pioneers and early adopters, playing just a secondary role 
in the decisions of most farmers who rely on earlier adopters as sources of influence (Valente 1996; 
Rogers 2003; Smith-Doerr and Powell 2005).
21 However, this may be an oversimplified picture of the 
complex network of influences that various actors exert along the adoption–decision process. Table 1 
shows how extension theory and practice have over time added more details to the picture. Regretfully, 
these insights have not been adequately considered in empirical adoption studies. 
Table 1. Farmers’ main sources of information in every phase of the adoption process 
PHASE   1. Awareness  2. Interest  3. Evaluation  4. Trial  5. Adoption 
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Source: Carey 1999 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Current et al. (1995); Saín and Barreto (1996); Ramírez and Schultz (2000); Evenson (2001); Knight et al. (2003) ; Owens et al. 
(2003); Ransom et al. (2003); Marsh et al. (2000, 2004); Feder et al. (2004); Mercer (2004); Abdoulaye and Sanders (2005); 
Abdulai and Huffman (2005); Oladele (2005); Bravo-Ureta et al. (2006); and Dinar et al. (2007). 
20 Rogers (2003) states that change agents’ success in securing adoption is positively related to (1) the outreach efforts of the 
agent; (2) their “client orientation” (as opposed to an “agency orientation”); (3) program compatibility with clients’ needs; (4) 
their empathy with clients; (5) their degree of homophily with clients (the higher the social status, social participation, formal 
education and cosmopolitanism of the client, the better their interaction); (6) their credibility in the clients’ eyes; (7) their 
utilization of opinion leaders; and (8) the development of clients’ skills to evaluate innovations. 
21 This perception shaped the training-and-visit (T&V) system of extension promoted by the World Bank for the diffusion of 
Green Revolution technologies in the mid-1970s. The T&V system focused extension efforts (and incentive mechanisms) on 
innovators and early adopters (Röling et al. 1976). The rationale for the strategy came from the two-step model of 
communications (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955, Katz 1957), according to which these “influentials” (Weimann 1994) or “innovation 
champions” (Howell and Higgins 1990), characterized as more educated and cosmopolitan, less risk averse, and more open than 
their peers to external information, could be more easily induced to adopt and would act as models to the other farmers. Once a 
certain threshold of adopters had been surpassed, the accumulated mass of contagious sources would suffice for the ulterior 
contagion via peer-to-peer communication, requiring no additional support.   15
Table 1 can be improved in at least two ways. First, change agents in the table are only 
represented by salespeople and government agencies. However, the diversity of change agents has 
become much larger in the last two decades in developing countries, with technical agents from NGOs 
and projects financed by a large diversity of agencies becoming central actors in substituting for a 
shrinking public sector.  
Second, the table considers only the role of actors as sources of information. According to Van 
den Ban and Hawkins (1996), when restricted to informational and advisory services, extension agents 
have limited power to influence farmers, because that influence depends on farmers’ willingness to trust 
the extension agents’ intentions and on the agents’ ability to help farmers achieve goals. However, when 
agents are also responsible for the distribution of incentives to adopt, they enjoy much more power and 
opportunities to persuade farmers to change in the promoted direction. In fact, the promotion of 
innovations among poor farmers in developing countries by extension agents is usually accompanied by a 
diversity of persuasive mechanisms and incentives that reduce risk and palliate farmers’ limited 
investment and absorptive capabilities for adoption (e.g., subsidized or free provision of key inputs, 
infrastructure, and technical advice; and marketing support to ensure household earnings while 
“incubating” entrepreneurship). Deployment of such mechanisms has the effect of yielding steeper S-
shaped diffusion curves that reach adoption ceilings in much shorter periods.
22 These inducing measures 
are applied even more intensively by NGOs and development projects, which are often urged to meet 
quantitative goals and show results in the limited time span allowed by sponsors and authorities. As a 
result, change agents are likely to have more influence on adoption timing and rates and to remain 
influential along the adoption process than is generally acknowledged in the literature.  
The persuasive nature of extension practice paved the way for the creative design of multiple 
schemes and strategies for inducing adoption that are now found in developing settings. Many early 
extension programs were based on the common assumption that changes in knowledge (i.e., providing 
information) would be followed first by changes in attitude and then by changes in behavior. However, as 
relationships between those variables proved neither lineal nor evident, more parallel incentive 
mechanisms were introduced in extension practice (Leeuwis and Van den Ban 2004). In this context, 
Röling considered extension as “interventology”—that is, as “an instrument of premeditated, deliberative 
intervention to achieve the interventors’ goals . . . only effective by inducing voluntary change and hence 
by satisfying client goals” (1988, 39).  
Van den Ban and Hawkins (1996) provide a good summary of the diverse methods that extension 
agents resort to for influencing farmers’ behavior. They include (1) compulsion or coercion (agents apply 
sanctions to enforce recommended practices, as in the case of dairy inspectors); (2) exchange (e.g., 
extension agents organizing farmers to obtain fairer trade negotiations with external merchants and then 
supervising farmers to comply with those agreements); (3) advice (trusted expertise gives extension 
agents the say on which solution to choose for a certain problem); (4) training to influence farmers’ 
knowledge levels and attitudes (to increase the confidence, capacities, and commitment of capable and 
cooperative farmers); (5) manipulation (influencing farmers’ knowledge and attitudes without farmers’ 
awareness); (6) providing means (such as soft credits for purchasing land or inputs) with positive 
distributional effects (generally used as a temporary measure to stimulate initial adoption up to a 
threshold); (7) providing a service as temporary relief in performing a time-consuming task (e.g., 
completing forms or registering information; if sustained, this could generate dependence or create a need 
for a service market); (8) changing farmers’ social or economic structure (by prioritizing participation of 
the worse-off in the services or by forming self-help groups; usually opposed by those individuals or 
groups losing power or income as a result of the introduced changes). 
Besides extension agents, local authorities and formal leaders can also play the role of change 
agents: they exercise power by virtue of their positions and can have considerable political and social 
                                                      
 
22 Many authors question the sustainability of those innovations: once external funds and incentive mechanisms are dropped, 
abandonment rates are usually very high (cf., Current et al. 1995; Fischer and Vasseur 2002; Alavalapati et al. 2004).    16
influence given the command they exert over local resources and the prestige and prominent position they 
occupy in the local network. They may also wield considerable power over collective decisions and can 
play a legitimizing role over the activities of other external change agents. 
For technological innovations, such as agrochemicals or crop varieties, the role of the private 
sector (product developers, input sellers, product buyers) has grown extensively in developing countries 
through marketing strategies such as providing free samples, partial financing, technical support, a 
secured market, and additional services used when implementing initial trials as well as during the period 
of increasing replacement of previous technologies. Using the strategies has given these actors an 
increasing role in determining the decisions of farmers to innovate (Berdegué and Escobar 2002; 
Berdegué 2005).   17
3.  METHODOLOGY 
This study combined elements of econometrics and social network analysis to assess diffusion processes 
of agricultural innovation in various regions and agricultural sectors in Bolivia.  
3.1. Research Question and Hypotheses Tested 
The main research question of this study was how interactions between farmers and other change agents 
and actors in the farmers’ communication networks influence their behavior toward the adoption of 
agricultural innovations. A set of variables describing the likely effects of interactions on the adoption of 
innovations by farmers were tested with regard to both the influence of the aggregate structure of 
interactions in every study region and the specific interaction between individual farmers and the main 
promoter of innovations. Those descriptors of social interaction showing a more significant association 
with adoption behavior were further combined in simple econometric models to test their combined 
effects and the robustness of those results. 
Combining the insights and predictions postulated by the various perspectives reviewed in 
Section 2 led to the derivation of  the set of hypotheses shown in Table 2 on the expected outcomes of the 
key analyzed interactions.  
3.2. Operationalization of Adoption 
Many innovation studies use dichotomous variables to account for adoption (Doss 2006). That approach 
is valid for indivisible technologies and management practices that cannot be partially implemented. 
However, to assess the adoption of innovations that can be partially implemented, such as new inputs or 
cultural practices, continuous measures are preferable. That is especially true for externally induced 
innovations, because most farmers end up adopting, at least in small proportions, while incentives last. 
Moreover, continuous dependent variables are also preferable when conducting cross-sectional studies in 
developing countries, because the actual (observable) intensity of innovation use is a more reliable figure 
than farmers’ recall on the time of initial adoption. Nonetheless the utilization of a continuous dependent 
variable carries the problem of identifying the appropriate time for measuring adoption intensity when 
employing cross-sectional survey data.  




1. A region with more 
social interaction has a 
more intense average 
adoption. 
The average degree of adoption is greater: 
a.  the greater the network density; and 
b.  the shorter the average distance to market. 
 
2. A region where 
interaction is more 
concentrated around a few 
central actors has a more 
intense average adoption. 
The greater the network centralization, the greater the 




3. A region where the 
promoter of innovation is 
better reputed has a more 
intense average adoption 
rate.  
The greater the degree centrality of the promoter in the 
network of interactions among change agents in a region, 
the greater the average degree of adoption.   18




4. A farmer with more 
frequent participation in 
more organizations adopts 
more intensively. 
Adoption is more intense: 
a.  the greater the number of organizations the farmer is 
affiliated with; and 
b.  the more frequently the farmer participates in 
organizational meetings. 
5. A farmer with more 
intense interactions adopts 
more intensively.  
 
Adoption is more intense: 
a.  the greater the frequency of conversations on 
technological issues between the farmer and other 
actors; 
b.  the greater the frequency of conversations on market 
issues between the farmer and other actors; and 
c.  the more alters a farmer has a frequent or very 
frequent interaction with (i.e., the greater the 
farmer’s degree centrality in a network that considers 
only frequent and very frequent interactions to define 
the existence of ties). 
Individual 
 
6. A farmer exposed to 
more and better-quality 
persuasion adopts more 
intensively.  
Adoption is more intense: 
a.  the greater the frequency of interaction between the 
farmer and the main promoter of innovation; 
b.  the greater the frequency of interaction between the 
farmer and other technical agents; 
c.  the greater the frequency of interaction between the 
farmer and market agents (input sellers, product 
buyers, and transporters); 
d.  the lower the frequency of interaction between the 
farmer and other farmers; 
e.  the greater the frequency of interaction between the 
farmer and other agents who interact frequently with 
the main promoter of innovation; 
f.  the higher the farmer’s trust on externally-provided 
technical information; and 
g.  the higher the farmer’s trust on externally provided 
market information. 
7. A farmer with stronger 
ties to local peers behaves 
like the local average 
adopter 
The higher the frequency of interactions between the 
farmer and other farmers, the closer to the network 
average is the farmer’s adoption rate. 
 
Mixed 
8. A farmer’s adoption 
behavior is determined by 
that of local comparitors 
(referents). 
The higher the structural equivalence between two 
farmers, the more similar their adoption intensity rates. 
 
Another argument for using a continuous variable to depict adoption behavior is that adoption is a 
dynamic process through which individual farmers pass from becoming familiar with an innovation, to 
forming an attitude about it, to making a decision on its possible adoption or rejection, to implementing 
the innovation on a trial basis, and finally confirming or discontinuing the decision (Rogers 2003). Even 
after adoption has been confirmed, the degree or intensity of adoption (e.g., the share of the total 
operation using the adopted innovation) is highly variable from season to season.
23 On the other hand, 
                                                      
 
23 Among other factors, innovations can be gradually adopted or abandoned as (1) the factors that determined their initial   19
cross-sectional studies are static by definition, being unsuited for studying before and after situations,
24 
learning effects, or the welfare impacts and distributional outcomes of adoption (Feder and Umali 1993).  
According to Cameron (1999), cross-sectional data captured early in the diffusion process—when 
the innovation has not diffused widely and thus social learning is ongoing—yield estimates that are not 
seriously biased by the omission of a learning component. Results from Feder and Umali (1993) and 
Dong and Saha (1998), who found that many of the key constraints of early adoption (such as farm size, 
tenure, education, extension, and credit) lose significance as diffusion proceeds,
25 and from Feder and 
Slade (1984), who found that over time most farmers adopt and their levels of use converge to a ceiling, 
also suggest focusing on early adoption and its determinants, when policy initiatives to encourage 
adoption may be effective.  
Thus, for externally induced diffusion processes, adoption studies relying on cross-sectional data 
are likely to perform better when capturing data on adoption intensities a few years after efforts for 
promoting those innovations were initiated.  
In the cases analyzed for this study, the innovations consisted of sets
26 of five to eight individual 
components (including, in the case of peanut production, the introduction of improved varieties, plant 
protection measures, introduction of enhanced agronomic procedures, and support in marketing) that had 
been promoted during the preceding two to three years. The actual composition of the sets varied 
according to subsector and region.
27 Given the preceding observations, the main dependent variable used 
was adoption intensity of those innovation sets at the end of the third year following initiation of the 
project interventions that promoted their use. An estimate of adoption intensity was calculated for every 
farmer according to the following procedure: The intensity of utilization of each component was 
estimated by the surveyor, relative to the expected condition under complete adoption (e.g., the 
percentage of total area planted to quinoa using the recommended practice, or the percentage of total 
peanut harvest processed with the recommended procedure). Once individually estimated for every 
component (on a percentage basis), a single average of adoption intensities was calculated for each farmer 
across all the locally promoted components.  
With this type of data, the focus of the study was not to analyze processes of innovation over time 
but to find out, in various adoption scenarios, what factors influence farmers’ decisions to adopt 
innovations, particularly in terms of the interactions and communications they maintain in their 
surrounding social networks. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
adoption differ from those that affect intensity of use; (2) they are further adapted and redesigned by adopters to respond to local 
conditions; (3) their initial outcomes persist or even improve as farmers learn by doing, exchange additional information and 
experiences with their peers and advisors, and sequentially adopt additional components of a larger package; and (4) their 
performance is compared with competing alternatives and its potential is affected by emerging complementary innovations 
(Feder 1982; Byerlee and de Polanco 1986; Leathers and Smale 1991; Smale et al. 1994; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003). 
24 Retrospective data can be collected from farmers, but recall and selection biases can be present (Deseran and Black 1981; 
Bernard et al. 1984; Freeman et al. 1987; Doss 2006) 
25 According to Feder and Umali (1993), in time, it is the location-specific agroclimatic and environmental variables that 
become the main determinants of differences in adoption rates. 
26 This paper uses the term set instead of package because the latter is normally associated in Latin America with a linear 
model of communication that conceptualizes innovations as ready-to-use products designed by the experts and transferred by 
extension agents to passive farmers whose only role is to accept or reject the offer. Package also implies a sense of unity, so that 
complete acceptance of the whole group of recommendations is preferable over sequential adoption because of the expected 
synergies among components. In the present case, the analyzed sets included both related and independent components.  
27 A companion study (Hartwich and Monge, forthcoming) undertakes the analysis of adoption of those specific innovations 
individually, per crop. The present study was interested in testing whether the effects of social interactions on adoption could be 
detected at a broader level of analysis (i.e., across technologies or crops).   20
3.3. Data Collection 
The innovations analyzed in this study were sets of technological recommendations promoted among 
small-scale producers involved in either fish culture (in the region of the humid tropics), cultivation of 
peanuts (in the region of the valleys), or quinoa production (in the altiplano region). Thus, the cases 
studied present a sample across very distinct subsectors and regions. In each of these three subsectors, 
four microregions were selected where different sets of technological recommendations were transferred 
by different technical assistance agencies. In each microregion, diffusion of the focal innovations had 
been in place during the preceding two and a half to three years.  
Data were collected in the field from September to December 2005 by three teams, each 
consisting of two students and one supervising researcher. A total of 360 farmers were interviewed (120 
from each of the three economic activities) using a stratified sampling procedure. In each of the 12 
microregions, 25 producers were randomly selected among all adopters, and 5 more were randomly 
selected from the nonadopters stratum. In most microregions, the 25 producers constituted more than 50 
percent of the whole population, and in few cases, they constituted 100 percent of the population. It is 
worth noting that this type of sampling procedure is not optimal for a more in-depth analysis of social 
interactions. An extensive literature discusses the inconveniences of normal sampling methods for 
studying networks given the boundary specification problem and, even worse, because the actual picture 
of the structure of interactions that can be obtained from the opinions of a few respondents can be 
incomplete and misleading (Marsden 2005).  
Farmers were interviewed regarding three aspects of their interactions (i.e., their communication 
with other actors regarding technological issues):  
•  Frequency (valued according to a Likert scale ranging from 5 = very high to 1 = very low) 
•  Usefulness (valued according to a Likert scale ranging from 5 = very useful to 1 = not useful) 
•  Effectiveness (at generating practical and timely solutions to field problems, measured as a 
binary variable with 1 = yes and 0 = no) 
Data were gathered using a questionnaire that guided farmers to identify the specific names of the 
most relevant promoters of innovation they interact with frequently. The promoters were classified 
according to a taxonomy of “types of actors” applicable across microregions, which included the 
following categories: NGOs or projects, research institutions, public extension agencies, input sellers, 
product buyers, transporters, relatives, neighbors, farmers’ organizations, and local governments. To 
complete the set of independent variables, data were also collected regarding farmers’ sociodemographic 
attributes, their perceptions on the utility of adopting the promoted innovations, and their resource 
endowments. 
Based on the data gathered from farmers, a list of key change agents was developed for each 
microregion, and arrangements were made to interview a representative of each change agent using a 
similar questionnaire to obtain relational data on farmers’ interactions with other change agents. Again, 
the same types of relations—that is, communications on technological innovation issues—were assessed 
using the same three indicators (frequency, usefulness, and effectiveness). This allowed for 
approximating the network of interactions in both directions (from farmers to change agents and from 
change agents to farmers) in each region.  
3.4. Definition and Estimation of Relational Variables 
The relational data obtained were based on perceptions of small farmers and change agents on their 
interactions regarding technological issues with other farmers and specific change agents operating in 
their microregion. Those data were aggregated into affiliation or bimodal networks, where farmers 
(actors) were qualified with regard to their affiliation to other farmers and change agents they interact   21
with (events). Bimodal networks can be written in matrix form and allow the application of a wide range 
of social network analysis tools that provide estimators of relational variables required for testing the 
proposed hypotheses. The set of variables used is described in Table 3.  
Table 3. Variables used 




Average degree of adoption across the diverse components of 








Density  Network density in every microregion  Continuous 
(index) 
Centralization  Degree of network centralization in every microregion  Continuous 
(index) 
Prestige  In-degree centrality of the main promoter of innovation within 




Centrality  Degree centrality of every farmer in the farmer–agent 
affiliation networks  
Continuous 
(index) 
Promoter  Frequency of farmer’s interaction with the main promoter of 
innovations in every microregion  
Ordinal 
Other_Tech  Frequency of farmer’s interaction with other technical change 
agents (researchers, extension agents from the government, 
NGOs, projects) 
Ordinal 
Other_Mkt  Frequency of farmer’s interaction with other market change 
agents (input sellers, product buyers, transporters) 
Ordinal 
Other_Farm  Frequency of farmer’s interaction with other farmers 
(neighbors, relatives)  
Ordinal 
Simmel  Degree of cohesion of farmer’s ties to other change agents 
strongly tied to the main promoter of innovations  
Continuous 
(index) 
Struct_Equiv  Degree of structural equivalence between pairs of actors  Dummy 
Membership  Number of organizations farmer affiliated with  Continuous 
Meetings  Frequency of farmer’s participation in organizational meetings  Ordinal 
Conversa_Tech  Frequency of farmer’s conversation with other actors on 
technological issues 
Ordinal 
Conversa_Mkt  Frequency of farmer’s conversation with other actors on 
market issues 
Ordinal 
Trust_Tech  Degree of farmer’s confidence in externally provided 
technical information 
Ordinal 
Trust_Mkt  Degree of farmer’s confidence in externally provided market 
information 
Ordinal 
Other    
Distance  Farmer’s distance to the main market for his or her product  Continuous 
(km) 
Distan_Reg  Average distance to markets in every microregion  Continuous 
(km) 
Consumption  Output share destined for household consumption  Continuous (%) 
Education  Education level of household head  Ordinal 
Age  Age of household head  Continuous 
Farm_Size  Size of farm  Continuous (ha) 
Experiment  Farmer’s self-declared propensity to experiment  Ordinal 
Output Expected  output  increases  as a result of adoption   Ordinal   22
The following paragraphs provide brief descriptions of the methods used to compute the most 
important of the variables listed in Table 3. Intensity was already described in Section 3.2.  
Density is a simple cohesion measure that, on the individual node or network level, indicates the 
proportion between actual ties and possible ties. Calculating network density required using the  data on 
the frequency of interaction between individual farmers (as actors) and other farmers and change agents 
(as events) and following common procedures of processing affiliation networks with UCINET (Borgatti 
et al. 2002). First, based on the bimodal networks, the sociomatrix of the bipartite graph was generated for 
each microregion. Then the data was dichotomized by setting the cutoff point greater than 3, thus 
considering as present only the ties characterized by a frequent or very frequent interaction. Density 
estimates were obtained after those transformations. 
Centralization is an indicator of how much a network presents a core-periphery structure. It is 
regularly computed with Freeman’s formula, ∑ [c* – ci] / max ∑ [c* – ci], which implies adding the 
differences in centrality between the most central actor, c*, and all other actors, ci, normalized by the 
maximum centralization possible over all connected graphs, max ∑ [c* – ci], which is regularly the star 
graph. In this study, it was calculated using Everett and Borgatti’s recommendations for extending regular 
centralization to affiliation networks (2005). First, Centrality was computed; this variable is the degree 
centrality of every farmer in the affiliation network, which corresponds to a count of ties between actors 
and events normalized by the maximum number of events each farmer could have been affiliated with. It 
was also necessary to compute the degree centrality of every event, which was the count of ties between 
events and actors normalized by the maximum number of actors every event could have hosted. With 
those data, it was possible to identify c*, the actor with the highest degree centrality (either an actor or an 
event), to use in estimating centralization. Finally a particular normalization term was computed based on 
the formula ( o i o i i o n n n n n n + + − − ( ) 1 ) / ( o in n ), where no is the size of the node set that contains the 
actor with the highest centrality score (this value could be either n or m), and ni is the size of any other 
node. It represents the maximum degree centrality possible in affiliation networks.  
Prestige is an in-degree centrality index representing the number of times the main promoter of 
the set of innovations in every microregion was nominated by other change agents as the object of 
frequent or very frequent interactions, normalized by the maximum possible number of nominations. This 
measure was taken from the square matrix of interactions among the distinct change agents present in 
every microregion. 
For Promoter, farmers determined their frequency of interaction with the specific organization 
acting as the main promoter of the set of innovations in every microregion, based on a Likert scale with 
the following options: 5 = very frequent, 4 = frequent, 3 = intermediate, 2 = infrequent, and 1 = very 
infrequent. In the case of Other_Tech, Other_Mkt, and Other_Farm, their values were determined by 
taking averages across the values assigned by each farmer, based on the same Likert scale, to the various 
change agents and actors belonging to each of the following categories (i.e., all research and extension 
agencies plus NGOs and projects but excepting the promoter for Other_Tech; input sellers, product 
buyers, and transporters for Other_Mkt; and neighbors, relatives, and farmers’ organizations for 
Other_Farm). 
To compute Simmel—an index of Simmelian or embedded ties—first, out of the original bimodal 
network in every microregion, a new affiliation network was generated by simply deleting the column 
corresponding to Promoter. The new matrix thus generated was then multiplied by another one consisting 
of a single column that contained the values of the frequency of interaction of all other change agents with 
the main promoter. This procedure generated a single column of indices of the embeddedness of farmers’ 
ties to other change agents (excluding Promoter) as affected precisely by those agents’ interactions with 
Promoter. Simmel does not deal with triads but rather with Simmelian or cohesive dyads, as described by 
Krackhardt and Kilduff (2002) and Reagans and McEvily (2003). 
Estimating Struct_Equiv, or the degree of structural equivalence between each pair of nodes, 
required the following procedure: First, the bimodal network of each microregion was dichotomized, 
leaving as present only the ties indicating a frequent or very frequent interaction. Then the bimodal   23
networks thus obtained were transformed into one-mode affiliation matrices—that is, matrices that show 
the number of events that every pair of farmers coincides with. Put another way, cells in these matrices 
indicate the number of social influence agents to which both farmers in a dyad are structurally 
equivalent—that is are coincidentally tied by frequent or very frequent interactions. Finally, the degree of 
similarity among every pair of actors was calculated using the Jaccard coefficient.
28 
Meetings, Conversa_Tech, and Conversa_Mkt were assigned values directly by farmers based on 
a Likert scale containing the following options: 5 = at least once a week, 4 = every other week, 3 = once a 
month, 2 = every other month, and 1 = practically never. Finally, the variables Education, 
Experimentation, and Output were also directly evaluated by farmers, based on the Likert scales with the 
following ranges: from 5 = very advanced to 1 = very basic for Education; from 5 = likes it a lot to 1 = 
completely dislikes it for Experimentation; and : from 5 = very high to 1 = insignificant for Output. 
It is important to clarify that, strictly speaking, this study did not analyze how social networks 
determine farmers’ adoption processes. It did not reconstruct the complete specific reference group 
surrounding each interviewed farmer and therefore could not discriminate between learning and 
mimicking processes. Instead, social network analysis tools were used to process relational data and 
generate a diversity of structural attributes that can be easily incorporated into econometric models as 
determinants of adoption at the individual level, arguably as descriptors of individual social capital. 
3.5. Data Processing and Analysis 
Basic input into the data analysis comprised the perceptions of individual farmers on their interactions 
with a diversity of change agents in a microregion, aggregated into affiliation matrices. Moving from a 
site-specific level of analysis to a more aggregate level, as a means of comparing interactions among 
subsectors or even obtaining a general picture across all subsectors, required fitting raw relational data to 
the fixed number of categories of change agents specified earlier (our taxonomy of 10 types of change 
agents).
29 Diverse graphs were generated as a result, which allowed visualizing diverse structural features 
of those interactions.  
All graphs shown in the results section were generated using the NetDraw software included as 
part of the Ucinet for Windows software (Borgatti et al. 2002). NetDraw generates network graphics on 
the basis of a spring-embedding algorithm that allows a better visualization of the relative distances and 
positions of actors and events in the network. NetDraw locates nodes in a two-dimensional space 
according to the criteria of (1) observability (avoiding overlap), (2) the number of ties reported by each 
actor (actors with higher degree centrality are closer to the center of the network), and (3) maintaining the 
same length for all ties. In addition, in bimodal networks, the more events in which two nodes coincide, 
the closer those nodes are located to each other. 
Social network analysis tools in the Ucinet software were used to undertake the diverse 
procedures required to compute the various relational variables described in Section 3.4. The diverse 
variables found as key determinants of adoption at the regional level were then combined in regression 
analysis using standard OLS procedures. The results from the OLS estimation as well as bivariate 
correlation analysis (Pearson’s coefficient and Kendall’s tau-b [τ]) were then tested with Ucinet software, 
which is instrumental for running diverse statistical testing procedures by simulation (randomization), 
running permutation-based significance tests, and using quadratic assignment procedures (QAP) (Baker 
and Hubert 1981; Krackhardt 1987, 1988; Snijders and Borgatti 1999; Hanneman and Riddle 2005).  
                                                      
 
28 In low-density networks, the “matches,” “correlation,” and “distance” measures of similarity are inconvenient because 
they show low variation among actors. The Jaccard coefficient is a good option because it calculates the number of times that 
both actors in a dyad report a tie to the same event as a percentage of the total number of ties reported, thus ignoring cases where 
none is tied to that event (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).  
29 Despite generating composed data (e.g., averaging ordinal data and aggregating data into “average” nonexisting relations), 
this procedure was deemed very helpful for generating aggregate-level graphs that permitted to visualize the general trends 
found.   24
The rationale for the application of permutation testing procedures is as follows: Because 
relational data are, by definition, not independent, their statistical analyses should not be undertaken using 
standard statistical procedures. The standard formulas for computing standard errors and inferential tests 
on attributes in correlations and regressions generally assume independent observations. Applying them 
when the observations are not independent can be misleading. In general, the standard inferential 
formulas for computing sampling variability (i.e., standard errors) give unrealistically small values for 
network data. Using a standard inferential formula results in the worst kind of inferential error—the false 
positive, which means rejecting the null when one should not. To avoid these problems, permutation 
approaches can be used to calculate sampling distributions of statistics directly from the observed 
networks by using random assignment across hundreds or thousands of trials under the assumption that 
the null hypothesis is true.  
Finally, a set of regression analyses using a Tobit model were applied to understand multivariate 
effects on the individual level of adoption of innovation. Various models were run, including or excluding 
certain explanatory variables testing their combined effect and the robustness of the results. Tobit models 
are censored normal regression models perfectly fit to the type of dependent variable used in the present 
study (ranging from zero to 100 percent and censored to the left as the sample population consists of both 
adopters and nonadopters) and have been frequently used in studies of adoption of agricultural 
innovations (cf., Adesina and Baidu-Forson 1995; Pender and Kerr 1998; Feder and Savastano 2006; 
Moser and Barrett 2006).  
The innovation adoption decision by farmers is assumed to be motivated by utility maximization 
considerations and taken on the basis of their individual capacities and endowments with resources; the 
socioeconomic and agro-ecological framework conditions; and the way farmers are embedded in the 
social reference network for the innovation, determining access to knowledge and learning. If the 
perceived utility of adopting is larger than a certain threshold (e.g., if it is larger than the utility perceived 
based on the traditional technology), the innovation is expected to be adopted while a second decision, 
regarding the intensity of adoption, takes place (Akinola and Young 1985).  
The nonobservable underlying utility function that ranks the preference of the ith farmer is given 
by U (Ci, Si, Nij), where Ci is a vector of individual capacities and characteristics determining smallholder 
attitudes toward innovation, Si is a vector describing common socioeconomic and agro-ecological 
characteristics, and Nij is a vector describing farmers’ embeddedness in (and connection to) social 
networks. Although the utility function is unobserved, the relation between the utility derivable from a kth 
technology is postulated to be a function of those vectors and a disturbance term having a zero mean:  
 U ik = αkFi(Ci, Si, Nij) + uik,  i = 1, … n; k = 1,2   (1) 
where k = 1 for the proposed innovation package, and k = 2 for the old technology. Equation (1) does not 
require the function Fj to be linear. Because the utilities Uik are random, the ith farmer will select the 
alternative k = 1 if U1i > U2i or if the nonobservable (latent) random variable y* = U1i – U2i > 0. The 
probability that Yi equals one (i.e., that the farmer adopts any of the components of the proposed 
packages) is a function of the independent variables:  
Pi = Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(U1i > U2i)  
= Pr[α1Fi (Ci, Si, Nij) + e1i > α2Fi(Ci, Si, Nij) + e2i]  
= Pr[(e1i – e2i) > Fi (Ci, Si, Nij) (α2 – α1)]  
= Pr[μi > – Fi (Ci, Si, Nij)ß]  
= Fi(Xiß)   (2) 
where Xi is the n × m matrix of the explanatory variables, ß is an m × 1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated, Pr( ) is a probability function, μi is a random error term, and Fi(Xiß) is the cumulative 
distribution function for μi evaluated at Xiß. The probability that a farmer will adopt any of the 
components of the proposed packages is then a function of the vector of explanatory variables and of the   25
unknown parameters and error term. For all practical purposes, equation (2) cannot be estimated directly 
without knowing the form of F. It is the distribution of μi that determines the distribution of F. If μi is 
normal, F will have a cumulative normal distribution. Following equation (2), the functional form of F is 
specified with a Tobit model, where μi is an independently, normally distributed error term with zero 
mean and constant variance σ2:  
Yi = Xiß if i* = Xiß + μi > T (adoption) 
= 0 if i* = Xiß + μi ≤ T (nonadoption)   (3) 
where Yi is the probability of adopting (and the intensity of use of) the proposed innovations; i* is a 
nonobservable latent variable, and T is a nonobserved threshold level. The Tobit model therefore 
measures not only the probability that a farmer will adopt any of the proposed innovations but also the 
intensity of use of those innovations once adopted. Thus, equation (3) is a simultaneous and stochastic 
decision model (Langyintuo and Mekuria 2005).  
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4.  STRUCTURAL PATTERNS OF INTERACTION 
Before moving toward the testing of hypotheses, a descriptive analysis of the relational data was 
performed to visualize the structural patterns of interactions farmers maintain with a range of agents who 
explicitly (by technology transfer, technical advice, and joint learning) or implicitly (by providing 
opinions and information) influence farmers’ decisions to adopt innovation.  
4.1. Effective Interactions of Adopters and Nonadopters 
By treating data at the most aggregate level (i.e., averaging across all subsectors and regions by adopter 
and nonadopter categories), and by setting 0.7 to be the cutoff point for deciding whether an effective tie 
exists between the average adopter (nonadopter) and any of the 10 defined categories of agents,
30 a simple 
graph was obtained showing the categories of agents with whom adopting and nonadopting farmers 
maintain interactions that they consider effective for finding solutions to technical problems (Figure 1). 
Agents to whom no effective links were mentioned by either farmer category are listed in the upper-left 
corner of Figure 1.  
Apparently at this level of aggregation, the major difference between adopters and nonadopters is 
that the former consider their interactions with NGOs and farmers’ associations effective, whereas the 
latter do not. Farmers’ interactions with the public sector and market agents were not included at this 
aggregated level: they were considered ineffective by more than 70 percent of the farmers. On the other 
hand, farmers’ interactions with neighbors and family members were, on average, effective for both 
adopters and nonadopters. Remarkably, NGOs and projects were the only external agents with which 
farmers maintained effective links; this is consistent with farmers’ specifying NGOs as having—in the 
context of particular or public development projects—actively pursued the introduction of innovations 
among farmers. NGOs can thus be considered the main external promoters of agricultural innovations in 
the analyzed cases. 
                                                      
 
30 Because the “effectiveness” of the interaction was specified as a dichotomous variable, a 0.7 average value for the 
interaction with a certain type of agent would indicate that 70 percent of the respondents in the group (either adopters or 
nonadopters) considered effective their interactions with that type of agent.   27
Figure 1. Agents with whom the average adopter and nonadopter maintain effective interactions  
 
Note: Circles = average innovation adopter and non-adopter; squares = change agents. 
Figures 2a–c disaggregate by subsector the effective interactions maintained by farmers with 
other agents regarding the solution of technological problems. The patterns are similar to those depicted 
in Figure 1, with certain distinctions: In fish culture (Figure 2a), nonadopters also maintained effective 
links with product buyers. This can be explained by buyers of fish culture products often discussing 
matters of product quality with producers and providing them with information on how to improve 
production toward that end.    28
Figure 2a. Agents with whom the average adopter and nonadopter in fish culture production 
maintain effective interactions  
 
 
Note:  Circles = average innovation adopter and non-adopter; squares = change agents. 
In quinoa production (Figure 2b), the situation depicted is the same as that shown in Figure 1, 
with nonadopters finding their effective links restricted to individual peers and adopters indicating 
effective links with farmers’ associations and NGOs. This reflects the high degree of association found 
among quinoa-producing farmers in the altiplano region. The study revealed that few farmers in that 
region maintain individual relations with change agents or make independent choices. Rather, decisions 
on farming seem to be made collectively under the guidance of farmers’ associations in which almost all 
farmers have membership.  
In peanut production (Figure 2c), adopters maintained effective interactions not only with NGOs 
and farmers’ associations but also with market agents, such as product buyers and input suppliers. This 
reflects a strong market orientation in peanut production; in fact, 93 percent of peanut producers sell parts 
or all of their produce (Hartwich et al. 2006), and they can link up with a range of product buyers and 
input suppliers. Besides, some NGO projects that promote new forms of peanut production and marketing 
maintain and facilitate close affiliations with buyers and input suppliers.  
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Figure 2b. Agents with whom the average adopter and nonadopter in quinoa production maintain 
effective interactions 
 
Note: Circles = average innovation adopter and nonadopter; squares = change agents. 
Deeper insight into the structure of interactions in which farmers are embedded was obtained by 
plotting the ties of all individual farmers to the types of agents with whom they felt they had effective 
interactions. Figure 3 depicts the totality of such relations, clearly showing farmers’ neighbors, relatives, 
and associations, as well as NGOs, in central positions in the graph, indicating that more farmers reported 
having effective ties to those agents. Most interviewees said those agents were the most effective sources 
of information among the network of agents they interact with to solve technological problems. To the 
other extreme, governmental research and extension agents occupy a rather peripheral position in the 
perception of farmers. This certainly reflects governmental services practically ceasing operations long 
ago. In fact, it is only lately that research and extension activities have been promoted again by SIBTA, 
but mainly through third-party agents such as NGOs, producers’ associations, and independent 
consultants.  
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Figure 2c. Agents with whom the average adopter and nonadopter in peanut production maintain 
effective interactions  
 
Note:  Circles = average innovation adopter and nonadopter; squares = change agents. 
Among nonadopters, a considerable proportion (10 percent) reported no effective interactions 
with any agents (as depicted in Figure 3 by the isolated black nodes on the left), whereas only 5 percent of 
the adopters reported no effective interactions with any agents (gray isolates to the left). Nonadopters 
reporting any interactions are shown concentrated in the lower portion of the figure, because their 
effective ties were basically restricted to other farmers (neighbors and relatives) and market agents 
(product buyers and input sellers). Meanwhile, adopters are more evenly distributed in the figure, 
reflecting the multiple interactions they maintained with the diverse set of agents, especially with other 
farmers, NGOs, and farmers’ associations and to a lesser extent with market agents and local 
governments, which are almost at an equal distance to the core of the graph.  
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Note: White squares = agents; grey circles = innovation adopters; black circles = nonadopters; isolates are located at the left 
margin. 
When disaggregated per subsector (see Figures 4a–c), plotting of individual farmer interactions 
renders similar patterns, with the following particularities: NGOs had a highly central position in fish 
culture, an intermediate one in quinoa production, and a more marginal one in peanut production. On the 
one hand, this reflects the doubts of quinoa producers regarding their interactions with NGOs (and their 
closer affinity to their associations). On the other hand, in peanut production, it reflects innovation 
promotion by both NGOs and farmers’ associations (at times through publicly funded projects).    32
Figure 4a. Affiliation of fish culture producers to diverse types of agents  
 
Notes: Black circles = innovation adopters; gray circles = nonadopters; squares = change agents 
As shown in Figures 2a–c, peanut farmers seem to have a much more effective interaction with 
market agents than their counterparts in fish culture and quinoa production. In quinoa production, a much 
larger share of farmers were negative about the effectiveness of their interactions with other innovation 
agents, reflecting a broader cultural phenomenon in the altiplano region where indigenous farmers are 
often skeptical about new patterns of production brought to them from external agents (Muñoz Elsner et 
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Figure 4b. Affiliation of peanut producers to diverse types of agents  
 
Notes: Black circles = innovation adopters; gray circles = nonadopters; squares = change agents 
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Figure 4c. Affiliation of quinoa producers to diverse types of agents  
 
Notes: Black circles = innovation adopters; gray circles = nonadopters; squares = change agents 
4.2. Networks of Interactions among Agents that Influence Farmers’ Decisions 
To complete this section, Figures 5a–c depict the patterns of interactions among the four main promoters 
of innovation mentioned by farmers in every subsector (one per microregion, shown in the figures as 
squares) and other innovation agents or types of agents (depicted as circles). Line width represents the 
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Figure 5a. Main promoters of innovations in quinoa production and their more frequent 
counterparts  
 
Note: Squares = Main innovation promoters; circles = other change agents   36
Figure 5b. Main promoters of innovations in peanut production and their more frequent 
counterparts  
 
Note: Squares = Main innovation promoters; circles = other change agents   37
Figure 5c. Main promoters of innovations in quinoa production and their more frequent 
counterparts  
 
Note: Squares = Main innovation promoters; circles = other change agents 
Apparently, every main promoter of innovation was involved in a different set of relationships. 
For example, while the Fundación FDTA-TH1(Fundación de Desarrollo y Transferencia Agrícola - 
Trópico Húmedo) in Trinidad (fish culture) and ANAPO (Asociación de Productores de Oleaginosas y 
Trigo) in Mairana (peanut production) maintained frequent contact with six or more other types of agents, 
the NGOs CICDA (Centro Internacional de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Agrícola) and PROSUKO 
(Programa Suka Kollos) in southern altiplano and Pucarani (quinoa production), respectively, scarcely 
maintained contacts with two alters. In general, the networks of interaction among innovation agents were 
richer in peanut production, intermediate in fish culture, and sparser in quinoa.   38
5.  HOW RELATIONAL PARAMETERS INFLUENCE THE  
ADOPTION OF INNOVATION 
This section describes the results from testing the hypotheses formulated on the effects of social 
interactions on the intensity of adoption of innovations at the regional and individual farmer levels.  
5.1. Influence of Relational Parameters on Adoption at the Network Level 
Table 4 summarizes relational and demographic information for each of the variables required for testing 
hypotheses 1 through 3 related to the influence of the structure of interactions at the regional (network) 
level on the average adoption level at each of the studied regions. 
































1 55.83  39.7  37.9  50.15  16.000 
2 61.9  43.7  42.8  53.26  22.727 














4 72.5  39.3  20.0  69.73  26.316 
1 50.12  29.4  12.9  70.1  45.833 
2 52.73  42.3  16.7  54.79  28.571 



















4 64.86  44.2  22.5  38.46  38.889 
1 53.16  23.9  7.5  52.04  17.647 
2 27.41  11.8  74.8  76.44  20.000 



















4 57.51  24.2  36.7  71.07  5.882 
Average 53.52  33.7  26.5  58.06  24.566 
Adoption intensities (Intensity_Reg) for the sets of innovations promoted in every region ranged 
from 27.4 percent to 72.5 percent, with a general average of 53.5 percent. The average network density—
that is, the ratio of possible to present ties at the regional level—was 33.7 percent, ranging from 11.8 
percent to 44.2 percent among the regions. The average distance to market for farmers participating in the 
study was 26.5 km, while regional averages ranged from 6.3 to 74.8 km. It is interesting to note that the 
region with longest average distance to markets also had the lowest density of interactions (as common 
sense would suggest). However, the opposite was not true: the shortest average distances to market did 
not coincide with denser networks. The degree to which affiliations between farmers and innovation 
agents were centralized around one agent ranged from 38.5 percent to 76.4 percent in the various regions, 
with a general average of 58.1 percent. Finally, in the networks of interaction among the agents that 
influence farmers’ adoption decisions, the prestige of the main promoter of the package of innovations—
measured as their in-degree centrality—ranged from 5.9 to 45.8 percent among regions, with a global 
average of 24.6 percent.    39
Table 5. Averages, standard deviations and Pearson correlation coefficients of regional network 
variables 
Variable  Variable Average  Standard 
deviation  1  2 3 4 
1.  Intensity_Reg  53.52  11.41  —    
2. Density  33.70  9.78  .711***  —     
3. Distance  26.50  19.69  –.353  –.406 —   
4. Centralization  58.06  11.41  –.146  –.519 .489  — 
5. Prestige  24.57  11.53  .120  .320  –.379  –.156 
Note: *** p ‹ .01 
The standard bivariate correlation coefficients between the variables required for testing the 
effects of social interactions on adoption intensity at the regional level are shown in Table 5. Even for the 
small number of regions (networks) available for comparison in this section of our analysis (n = 12), 
evidence was obtained of a positive and highly significant association between network density and the 
average intensity of adoption in the region, supporting the prediction proposed in hypothesis 1. The other 
relational variables were not significantly associated with average adoption intensities; thus, our evidence 
did not provide support for hypotheses 2 and 3, even though the sign of the correlation coefficients were 
in the predicted direction (except for centralization). 
Table 5 also shows high correlation levels (though not significant) between some of the relational 
variables tested. In particular, network density was negatively associated with centralization and distance, 
and centralization was positively associated with distance. In all cases, the sign of the association is the 
one expected based on theoretical considerations. 
In bimodal networks, a high centralization level means that most actors are primarily attached to a 
single event (agent). The rationale for hypothesis 2 was that if most of the interactions related to technical 
innovations in a region were centered on the main promoter, less noise would be evident in those 
interactions and adoption levels would be higher. In the analyzed cases, it was rather the richness and 
multiplicity of contacts with a diversity of agents (events) influencing farmers’ decisions—that is, the 
density of interactions in the network of farmers and agents—that spurred adoption levels upward.  
To conclude, the simultaneous effects of the diverse variables used were tested by combining 
them into a very simple regression model for predicting average intensities of adoption at the network 
level. Table 6 reports the results for two specifications: model 1 includes only the four relational variables 
tested, and model 2 includes one additional nonrelational variable, Consumption_Reg, which reflects the 
average share of product output destined for home consumption by all farmers in a region (average = 
30.12 percent, standard deviation = 32.92). This variable was significantly correlated with adoption 
intensity (r = –.713, p < .01).    40
Table 6. Results from standard OLS regression and permutation-based significance tests for 
average adoption intensity at the regional (network) level 












Distan_Reg  – .159.  
(.738) 
– .159  
(.726) 








Consumption_Reg —  –.162 
(.776) 
R.
2  .636 .685 
R
2 adjusted  .429 .415 
Note: Simulation-based p values in parenthesis (** p ‹ .05) 
As Table 6 shows, model fit was high in both instances. However, aside from the Intercept, 
Density was the only variable with a significant coefficient in model 1, while none of the coefficients in 
model 2 was statistically significant. It would seem that by introducing the nonrelational variable into 
model 2, the strong association between density and intensity of adoption in model 1 was unmasked as 
largely spurious. Before making those conclusions, however, it is necessary to recall that our sample of 
networks was very small (n = 12). 
5.2. Influence of Relational Parameters on Adoption at the Individual (Farmer’s) Level 
Another test included in the study focused on the degree of association between diverse relational 
characteristics of individual farmers and their particular intensity of adoption as formulated in hypotheses 
4 through 6. Table 7 presents the averages and standard deviations for all variables considered in this 
section and shows the degree of association among them. Correlation tests were conducted following two 
approaches: Pearson correlation coefficients (r) were used whenever both variables were of continuous or 
interval nature, and Kendall’s tau-b (τ) were used for the cases in which at least one of the variables was 
ordinal. Permutation-based significance tests were conducted and their results are indicated as usual.  
Almost two-thirds of the variables included in the calculations to reflect some aspect of farmers’ 
interactions (X1 to X13) yielded significant correlations with adoption intensity, providing good support 
for hypotheses 4 and 5, as well as partial support for hypothesis 6. According to this preliminary 
evidence, the intensity of adoption of innovations by Bolivian farmers in three very different economic 
subsectors and across 12 different agro-ecological and sociocultural regions seems positively influenced 
by (1) a more frequent and more intense participation of the farmer in organizations, (2) a more frequent 
individual interaction with other social-influence actors (mostly with peer farmers and technical change 
agents), and (3) exposure to a more intense and better-quality persuasion by the promoters of innovation 
(and their close partners).    41
Table 7. Correlations between variables of social interactions and adoption intensity at the individual level 
Variables Average  Standard 
deviation 
Y X1  X2  X3  X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
Y. Intensity  53.28 24.93  —                
X1. Centrality  .34 .21  .33** —               
X2. Promoter  3.69 1.10  .27** .35**  —             
X3. Other_Tech  2.34 1.07 .05 .20**  –.06  —           
X4. Other_-Mkt  2.58 .88 .04 .30**  –.01 .12*  —         
X5. Other_Farm  3.53 .77  .19** .53** .34**  –.01  .10*  —       
X6. Simmel  37.26 19.32  .21** .47**  .04  .31** .45**  .06  —     
X7. Membership  1.35 .84  .32** .14**  .11*  .20** –.11*  .10*  –.08  —   
X8. Meetings  2.81 1.24  .12** .10* .15**  .26** –.07  .06  –.08* .27**  — 
X9. Conversa_Tech  2.77 1.29  .15** .17**  –.09  .24** .16**  .08  .06  .19** –.33** 
X10. Conversa_Mkt  2.69 1.33  .14** .15**  –.04  .24** .25**  .07  .04  .19** –.21** 
X11. Trust_Tech  3.29 1.07 .03 .13**  –.07 –.02  .17** .05  .15** .03  .03 
X12. Trust_Mkt  2.83 1.21 .00 .05  –.02  –.14**  –.01  –.01 –.04 .02  .12** 
X13. Distance  26.25 38.66 –.10 –.05 –.09  –.19**  –.02 –.11*  10 –.19** .03 
X14. Consumption  32.91 37.37  –.31** –.24**  .06  .10  –.23** –.12**  –.30**  .13  –.18** 
X15. Education  2.96 1.03  .09*  –.01  –.20**  .15**  .08 –.09 –.01 .10*  –.07 
X16. Age  44.66 12.73  –.17** –.16**  –.04  .03  .00  –.08*  –.03  –.14**  –.01 
X17. Age
2  2156 1216  –.18** –.17**  –.04  .03  .00  –.08*  –.06  –.13*  –.01 
X18. Farm_Size  14645 35485  .06 –.02  –.13**  .11* .07 –.04 –.11*  .30**  –.04 
X19. Experiment  3.84 1.06  .13** .15**  –.04  .23** .15**  .03  .07  .14** –.18** 
X20. Output  3.74 .92  .11* .18** .12*  .09  .06  .08  .13** –.07 –.17** 
Variables X9  X10  X11  X12  X13 X14 X15 X16  X17 X18 X19 
X10. Conversa_Mkt  –.58** —                   
X11. Trust_Tech  –.12** –.11*  —                 
X12. Trust_Mkt  –.01 –.03  –.32**  —               
X13. Distance  –.01 .15**  –.03  –.04 —             
X14. Consumption  .19** .18**  .14** .06  .02  —           
X15. Education  –.20** –.15**  .06  –.10*  –.04  .01  —         
X16. Age  .01 .04  .07  .06  .06  .10  –.12**  —       
X17. Age
2  .01 .04  .07  .06  .05  .12*  –.12**  .99**  —     
X18. Farm_Size  –.12** –.18**  .04  .09*  –.06 –.16**  .19**  –.01  –.01  —   
X19. Experiment  –.25** –.20**  –.14**  .01  –.01  –.08 .30**  –.04  –.04  .09*  — 
X20. Output  –.25** –.20**  –.18**  –.16**  .00 –.15** .01  .03  .03  –.06  .15** 
Note: **p ‹ .01; *p ‹ .05   42
The following subsections present a brief discussion of the implications of these results in terms 
of supporting the postulated hypotheses, before testing the combined effect of these relational variables, 
together with other nonrelational traits included in Table 7 (X13
31 to X20) on adoption intensity, using 
regression analysis.  
5.2.1. Bonding Social Capital: Farmers’ Organizations and Intensity of Adoption (Hypothesis 4) 
In our sample, farmers had membership in from 0 to 5 organizations, with an average membership of 1.35 
organizations per household, which seems a normal number by Bolivian standards.
32 On average, the 
interviewed farmers participated in organization meetings almost once a month. The positive and 
significant correlation of both variables (i.e., the number of organizations that farmers are affiliated with 
[X7] and the intensity of farmers’ participation in those organizations [X8], both commonly treated in the 
literature as indicators of bonding social capital) with the intensity of adoption provide good support for 
hypothesis 4, highlighting the positive effects of farmers’ involvement in peer organizations on 
innovation. Grootaert and Narayan (2004), Muñoz Elsner et al. (2004) and SOS FAIM (2004) have 
similarly found that farmers’ participation in organizations plays a notable role in increasing household 
welfare and innovation in Bolivia.  
5.2.2. Connectedness and Intensity of Adoption (Hypothesis 5) 
The role of farmers’ social connectedness as a factor in inducing higher adoption (hypothesis 5) obtained 
good support on the basis of the positive and significant association found between the three indicators 
used to describe the intensity of interactions and adoption levels. Either measured as the frequency of 
conversations on technological or market issues with other actors (X9 and X10) or as the degree centrality 
of the farmer in the network of farmer affiliations to innovation agents through frequent interactions (X1), 
higher connectedness, in quantitative terms, was consistently associated with greater adoption levels. It 
appears that farmers get relevant information out of these relationships, which support them in their 
decisions to adopt innovations.  
5.2.3. Persuasion and Influence: The Effects of Specific Agents, Cohesive Triads, and Trust on 
Adoption Intensity (Hypothesis 6) 
Although the significant association between connectedness and adoption intensity suggests that more 
connections predict more adoption, correlation tests also show that connection is both a quantitative and 
qualitative issue: whom farmers are connected to also matters significantly. Their interactions first with 
external information agents and second with peer farmers were the most strongly associated with the 
farmers’ adoption intensity.  
The positive and significant correlation found between the frequency of interaction with the main 
promoter of innovations (X2) and adoption intensity supported the first component of hypothesis 6. It can 
be interpreted as evidence of the effectiveness of the persuasive efforts implemented by promoters of 
innovation. These results also highlight the importance that promoters of innovation should give to the 
quality and frequency of interaction they maintain with potential adopters. 
On the other hand, the positive and significant association found between the frequency of 
interactions with other farmers (X5) and adoption intensity is contrary to expectations according to part 
(d) of hypothesis 6. Formulation of this component was based on the assumption that communities in the 
studied regions would be rather conservative, so that social norms would run against innovation and 
                                                      
 
31 At the regional level, the average distance to markets was considered a good proxy for the level of interactions within the 
region. However, at the individual level, distance to markets (X13) was not used as a relational variable because farmers could be 
located far away from the market but close to each other or, even more importantly, close to other innovation agents. 
32 In a study covering 1,000 households in the four main ecological regions of the country, Grootaert and Narayan (2004) 
found that the average household belonged to 1.4 groups and associations.   43
farmers with a greater interaction with their peers would be more constrained by those norms.
33 On the 
contrary, those interactions seem to spur greater adoption, rendering an image of rather innovation-prone 
farmers. These results could reflect, in part, the fact that most innovation promoters rely heavily on group 
communication techniques for servicing and training farmers (as also evidenced by the high correlation 
observed between the frequency of interaction with promoters and with other farmers [X2 and X5]). 
The frequency of interaction of farmers with other technical agents (aside from the main 
promoter)—that is, X3 and X4—had only a weak (insignificant) association with adoption intensity. 
Interestingly, however, the frequency of interaction with those who were strongly tied to the main 
promoter (X6), was in effect significantly associated with more adoption, thus providing support to part 
(e) of hypothesis 6. The fact that both variables (X2 and X6) were not correlated indicates that those two 
influences are different. Additional influence on farmers’ behavior would thus derive—in the direction 
suggested by the main promoter—from interacting with other agents closely related to the main promoter. 
This constitutes evidence of the existence of indirect influences or network effects that are not observable 
if the analysis remains concentrated at the still simplistic world of dyads.  
These findings allowed for characterizing the persuasive efforts of innovation promoters as 
having a two-fold impact on farmers’ attitudes and behavioral responses. On the one hand, there is a 
direct or “marketing” effect by which farmers adopt more intensively as a result of a more frequent direct 
interaction with the promoter. On the other hand, an indirect or “network” effect further influences 
farmers (and actually prompts them to adopt more intensively) when they interact frequently with other 
agents also strongly tied to the promoter: the pressures to conform with the expected behavioral response 
increase, and the social distance between promoter and farmers decrease as a result of a tertius iungens 
(Obstfeld 2005), a third party that joins and facilitates interaction (Figure 6). 
                                                      
 
33 See for example Godoy, Franks, and Alvarado. (1998) and Godoy, Morduch, and Bravo (1998).   44




Figure 6 shows a simple model of the farmers’ interaction with change agents in a triadic form, 
while considering the strength of ties linking pairs of actors. Strong ties (which, for the purposes of this 
study, are synonymous with frequent interactions and are depicted in the figure as thick lines) shorten the 
social distance between interacting actors. Only when all members of a triad are strongly tied to each 
other, as in part (d) of the figure, does an embedded or Simmelian tie occur, implying a further constraint 
on individual behavior (more pressure to comply with expectations) as well as a reduction in the social 
distance among all actors in the triad. In this study, that corresponds to a reduction in the differences 
between expected and actual behavior among the interacting actors. From the promoter’s perspective, that 
means increased acceptance by farmers of the focal innovation. 
To complete our discussion of hypothesis 6, it appears that the variables related to trust on 
information provided by outsiders (X11 and X12) are not significantly correlated with adoption intensity. 
Both coefficients have the expected sign, but the association was not significant in either case. This seems 
a contradictory result, because trust is a basic prerequisite for accepting innovations promoted by 
outsiders. Nonetheless, these variables are not specifically referred to the interaction with the main 
promoter of innovations but rather are applicable to any type of agent. In summary, they reflect the 
general predisposition toward technical and market information provided by external agents, a perception 
not necessarily reflecting farmers’ trust in the main promoter.  
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5.2.4. Correlations among Explanatory (Relational) Variables 
Table 7 shows high correlation levels among numerous relational variables. This is not surprising given 
that some of them were specifically included to reflect diverse aspects of the same phenomena.
34 In fact, 
the set of hypotheses address various aspects of one main phenomenon related to the farmers’ interactions 
with other agents influencing their attitudes toward innovation. The variables then are logically 
interrelated, and thus a large degree of correlation among them was expected. Based on these results, the 
most relevant factors were selected for inclusion in the ulterior regression exercise. The data shown in 
Table 7 allowed for verifying whether distinct titles were used for variables that captured essentially the 
same process.  
The highest correlation obtained (0.58) was among X9 and X10, which raises the issue of farmers 
not being overstrained to differentiate among the usefulness of technical and market aspects they 
discussed in their conversations with other change agents. The next highest correlation (0.53) appeared 
between farmers’ degree centrality (X1) and the frequency of interactions with other farmers (X5). X1 
was also strongly correlated with the remaining variables describing the frequency of interactions with 
other agents (X2, X4, and X6). Finally, the index of embedded ties (X6) was also highly correlated with 
the frequency of interactions with market agents (X4), who together with X3 are the main agents likely to 
have strong interactions with the main promoter of innovations. In summary, the largest correlations 
among relational variables were obtained for reasonable and easily explainable instances. 
5.2.5. Regression Analysis with “Relational” Individual Attributes 
A final step in the analysis of possible explicators of adoption intensity at the individual level was to 
include the variables used for testing hypotheses 4 through 6 as individual attributes in a regular 
regression model (Table 8). From the list of relational variables, only those of major interest were 
selected,
35 and two Tobit models with relational variables were specified. The first (model 2 in the table) 
includes X1 (farmer degree centrality) and X7 (number of organizations the farmer is affiliated with); the 
second (model 3 in the table) excludes the centrality measure and instead includes X2 (the frequency of 
interaction with the main promoter), X5 (the frequency of interaction with other farmers), and X6 (the 
index of Simmelian ties).  
The left part of the Table 8 compares the regression results of the two models just described with 
model 1, which includes only nonrelational variables regularly included as determinants of the intensity 
of adoption by small farmers in econometric studies. The right part of the table compares the same three 
models expanded to include dummy variables for 11 of the 12 studied regions (for readability, the 
coefficients of those 11 variables were dropped from the table). 
A quick comparison of the groups of models to the left and right of Table 8 allows for the 
realization that the inclusion of relational variables to the base model of each group (i.e., models 1 and 4, 
respectively) causes a slight reduction in the standard error of the estimate (i.e., the value of sigma or an 
ancillary parameter), as well as a moderate improvement in model fit measures.  
                                                      
 
34 Also, and especially in the case of bimodal networks, the methods used to estimate some of the relational parameters 
artificially reduced variability (e.g., dichotomization of valued graphs), thus approximating some of the measures in terms of 
their levels of association with the behavioral variable.  
35 Selection of the variables used in the various models was based on the following criteria: (1) ease of data collection and/or 
observability (avoiding the use of elaborated indices and giving preference to data that did not require a great deal of recall and 
estimation by farmers), (2) ease of estimation (when using individual relational parameters), (3) high correlation levels with a 
dependent variable, and (4) low correlation levels with other independent variables included (to avoid multicollinearity 
problems). 
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Table 8. Tobit regression coefficients for the diverse models of adoption intensity specified (n = 276)  
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 












X1. Centrality  —  9.113* 
(5.328) 
— —  1.462 
(5.259) 
— 
X2. Promoter  —  —  5.140*** 
(1.281) 
— —  .853 
(1.190) 
X5. Other_Farm  —  —  1.786 
(1.708) 
— —    1.015 
(1.797) 
X6. Simmel  —  —  –.005 
(.072) 
— —  .233** 
(.099) 

































































































































Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p ‹ .01; ** p ‹ .05; * p ‹ .10. 
† The pseudo-R
2 normally presented as part of the output of STATA is McFadden’s pseudo-R
2, which may not be the best 
measure of fit. This study calculated the R
2 between the predicted and the observed values, which is closer and can be interpreted 
similarly to the R
2 obtained from an OLS regression (see, http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/dae/tobit.htm). 
Analysis of models 1 through 3 reveals that, when included, one of the relational variables 
appears as the one with the largest effect on the dependent variable. In model 1, the most determinant 
variable is an indicator of farmer-expected output resulting from innovation. In model 2, centrality 
appears as the key variable for determining adoption intensity, while in model 3 the frequency of 
interaction with the main promoter of innovations is the variable with the largest effect on adoption 
intensity. In both models 2 and 3, the expected output occupies the second position. Model 3 allows 
visualizing that, among the diverse ties that form degree centrality measures; it was the degree of 
interaction with innovation promoters what mattered the most in the studied cases.  
The inclusion of location effects (i.e., models 4 through 6) caused an important improvement in 
terms of fit measures compared with those obtained with the first three models. Even though models 
including relational variables show better fit measures than the base model for this group (model 4), only 
one of the relational variables (X6) appears now as making a significant contribution to adoption 
intensity. Besides, consideration of location or contextual effects raised other variables as significant 
determinants of adoption (e.g., X15 and X19) and questioned the power of others (e.g., X13 and X14). 
However, the problem of including location dummies in a model is that they capture too many effects at 
once; therefore, one has no idea what one is accounting for. In fact, it is very likely that location dummies   47
obscure the explanatory power of all relational variables used in this study, because the agents that 
farmers interact with are location specific.  
A more detailed discussion of the theoretical model used as the basis for the present 
specifications, as well as a review of the econometric concerns surrounding the modeling of peer effects 
and a comparison of alternative approaches to proceed, will be the subject of a companion paper 
(Hartwich and Monge, forthcoming). The present paper focuses on demonstrating a simple way of 
including a diversity of relational variables into normal econometric models. Moreover, the high 
significance of the effects of some of the relational variables tested as additional components in a set of 
standard explanators of adoption intensity should suffice to highlight the potential gains of their 
consideration and inclusion in adoption studies. 
5.3. Effects on Adoption from Mixed Levels 
5.3.1. Social Influence by Peers and Adoption Intensity 
Hypothesis 7 posits that those farmers with stronger (i.e., more frequent) ties to their local peers 
(relatives, neighbors, and farmers’ organizations) are characterized by a closer-to-average adoption 
behavior (in terms of the speed and intensity of adoption) compared with farmers reporting less frequent 
interactions with other farmers.  
This is a complementary idea to that discussed for part (d) of hypothesis 6. The rationale behind 
this hypothesis comes from diverse arguments related to the innovativeness of farmers who are well 
connected to their local peers (a trait often used as a proxy for identifying opinion leaders). Some authors 
argue that this type of farmer tends to be innovative in modern societies but behaves conservatively in 
traditional settings, because multiple links make the farmer more constrained by the locally accepted 
norms (i.e., the farmer faces higher conformity pressures; Godoy, Franks, and Alvarado 1998; Godoy, 
Morduch, and Bravo 1998; Rogers 2003). A very similar prediction, though based on a very different 
argumentation, has been reproduced in network models of social contagion by physicists like Watts 
(2003, 2004). Watts argues that highly connected actors are more vulnerable to contagion and are more 
instrumental in the propagation of information in poorly connected networks, although they tend to be 
stable (conservative) in highly connected networks. For this study, the microregions were assumed to be 
rather traditional, with strong interactions among locals who are not strongly integrated to the market and 
have infrequent interactions with external agents.  
Results from the test for hypothesis 6 already provided sufficient evidence against these 
arguments, pointing to a positive correlation between adoption intensity and the frequency of interaction 
with other farmers. Congruently, the tests applied in this study did not provide for the hypothesis: the 
correlation coefficient between the frequency of interaction with other farmers and the difference between 
the regional average and individual adoption levels was rather low and not statistically significant (r = 
.051).  
According to Watts’ arguments (2003, 2004), this might be a result of the local networks being 
not so highly connected, something confirmed by the low density levels obtained in the analyzed regions. 
On more sociological or anthropological grounds, the picture that emerges from these results is that the 
analyzed networks are not so poorly integrated to the market nor so conservative, allowing highly 
connected actors (opinion leaders) to behave rather innovatively.    48
5.3.2. Social Comparison (Competition) and Adoption Intensity 
Testing hypothesis 8 required conducting a QAP
36 correlation test between the matrix of Jaccard 
similarities among actors with regard to their ties to alters and a matrix showing the absolute value of the 
difference in adoption levels between all pairs of actors. The Pearson coefficient for this test of 
correlation between the two matrices was –0.073. The level of association was low but significant, 
indicating that the higher the similarity between two farmers (in terms of the number of agents that both 
have frequent interactions with), the smaller the difference in their levels of adoption. To confirm these 
results, the same test was conducted for every region. The Pearson coefficient was negative and 
significant in 8 of 12 regions, negative but not significant in 3 regions, and positive but not significant in 
1 region. Thus, this study was able to verify the existence of this weak but significant association between 
structural equivalence and adoption intensity, which is equivalent to showing the existence of a weak 
tendency, among sampled farmers, to compete with and imitate the behavior of others in their comparison 
group. 
                                                      
 
36 QAP correlation calculates measures of nominal, ordinal, and interval association between two matrices and uses 
quadratic assignment procedures to develop standard error tests for the significance of association (Krackhardt 1987, 1988; 
Hanneman and Riddle 2005).   49
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper presents results from a study that used the methods and tools of social network analysis to 
analyze the effects of relational parameters on innovation processes that involve farmers and change 
agents in the diffusion of new agricultural knowledge and practices. As shown through an extensive 
literature review, the focus on relational parameters and effects of networking can contribute substantially 
to the understanding of innovation processes and have been intensively used for this purpose in fields 
such as sociology, marketing, and industry development. However, in the field of agricultural innovation 
in developed countries, a domain still dominated by economic models that explain adoption of 
innovations solely on the basis of resource endowment and sociodemographic parameters, effects of 
networking have only recently been introduced and often only in models that include a simplistic network 
variable. 
The analysis conducted in this study is not intended to elaborate a comprehensive econometric 
model for explaining adoption behavior of farmers—that is left to other studies and publications—but to 
explore a wide range of hypotheses related to the effects of social influence, cohesion, brokerage, and 
equivalence on farmers’ adoption of innovations and to identify measures that contribute to a better 
understanding of innovation processes. Thus, we encourage practioners in development to focus on the 
effects of social interaction when they promote agricultural innovation, and econometricians might 
discover reasons to take into account the complexity and interdependence with which social interactions 
influence agricultural innovation processes and go beyond the inclusion of a randomly chosen network 
variable in standard models on the adoption of innovation. 
In our approach, we have distinguished between innovating producers and those who influence 
farmers’ behavior toward adoption of innovation either purposefully (as do projects and extension agents, 
and eventually buyers and input providers) or unpurposefully by serving as peers and providing 
references (as do other farmers, neighbors, leading producers, and village authorities). The interactions 
between innovators and innovation promoters—a relation of particular importance in development 
settings where diverse external agents try to influence farmers—have rarely been analyzed in detail. 
However, if information were collected only on the basis of a bimodal farmer–peer network, the analysis 
would be cut short in terms of the relations among the farmers as well as among the peers; both of these 
relations, however, are important to understanding the way communication and interaction influence the 
behavior of farmers. Meanwhile, the tools of social network analysis—for example, the measures of 
centrality, brokerage, and closure and the identification of subgroups—cannot be fully deployed when 
only bimodal network data are available:  
In fact, the relational and interaction measures derived from our analysis must be carefully 
interpreted because we were not dealing with a regular “social network” of peer-to-peer contacts within a 
closed community but rather with patterned interactions describing the affiliation of individual farmers 
with different types of agents within a region. Even when other farmers were included as one of the 
categories with which farmers could be affiliated, the individual interactions among peer farmers could 
not be ascertained in detail. In this sense, the density measures estimated for each region gave us only a 
rough approximation to the real cohesion measure that could have been obtained by considering farmers’ 
ties to the set of peers with which they interacted, including other farmers. It might be argued that, 
estimated this way, the contributions of change agents are overestimated in the cohesion measures. In 
reply, we might argue that this way of dealing with relational data is also useful for accounting for the 
qualitative difference existing between these “vertical” linkages and the more “horizontal” ties that link 
farmers to their peers.  
Our analysis generated comfortable evidence with regard to the importance of four main effects 
of farmers’ interactions on their decisions to adopt innovations brought to them from the outside:  
•  The persuasiveness of change agents. Change agents, including NGOs, projects, and other 
agencies fostering adoption of innovation by means of technical assistance and technology 
transfer, can trigger the adoption of innovations among farmers by being more persuasive in   50
performing activities intended to improve the quality and quantity of the services they 
provide. In our study, we detected persuasion processes on the basis of the strong effects of 
the frequency of interactions with the main promoter of innovations on observed adoption 
intensity.  
•  The density of the network of social interactions and the intensity of social capital. On the 
network level, comparing 12 microregions, our results indicate that the denser the network of 
interactions between farmers and other agents involved in innovation processes, the higher 
the expected adoption intensity. Further, at the individual level, the intensity of adoption of 
innovations by producers in three agricultural subsectors and across 12 agro-ecologic and 
sociocultural microregions is positively influenced by a more frequent and more intense 
participation of farmers in producers’ organizations and more frequent interactions with other 
agents—mostly, with peer farmers and with key promoters of innovation. These findings 
suggest that farmers’ interactions with other farmers as well as change agents and peers 
substantially influence farmers’ decisions to adopt innovations. The embeddedness of 
producers in farmers’ social networks as well as their actual social capital and the social 
capital they are able to develop explain the way they can interact with other agents. 
•  The social influence that other agents in the network impose on producers. Pressure to 
comply with socially accepted norms and standards is another factor of importance in a 
farmer’s decision to adopt an innovation. In the study, social influence was evidenced by the 
effects of cohesion on adoption at the network and individual levels. The more intensely 
farmers participate in the network, the less likely they are to behave differently from their 
peers. In regions showing receptiveness to promoted innovations, as were all the 
microregions analyzed in this study, compliance pressures induce adoption.
37  
•  Competition with social referents. The greater the equivalence of two actors—for example, in 
terms of their ties to change agents and other actors—the greater the expected similarity in 
their behaviors. Producers would be moved toward adoption once those with similar patterns 
of social interactions adopt the innovation, regardless of the existence of direct ties among 
them. This phenomenon was evidenced by the corroboration of the effects of equivalence on 
a similar behavioral response (adoption intensities). The producers interviewed have a 
tendency to compete with and imitate the behavior of others in their comparison group. 
These findings have a number of implications for anyone involved in and making decisions on 
the design and implementation of projects and programs fostering agricultural innovation in poor rural 
communities:  
•  The study results call for a more nuanced understanding of how the embeddedness of farmers 
in social networks influences their decision to adopt innovations brought to them by various 
change agents. The exposure to new knowledge and technologies as well as the provision of 
subsidies to encourage adoption may not be enough if the social interactions are not 
appropriate.  
•  It is important to consider how the knowledge and technologies are transferred. Holding 
single training events and randomly visiting farmers and showcasing innovation practices 
may not be enough. Rather, it is the intensity of interactions with the main agent promoting 
the innovation as well as the opportunities given to the farmers to transfer codified 
knowledge into tacit knowledge for practical application that defines the efficiency of 
                                                      
 
37 This is, of course, a dynamic aspect of diffusion: the earlier in the process, the fewer adopters and the higher the 
reluctance to try risky alternatives; compliance pressures then favor the status quo.   51
extension and innovation promotion programs. Also it matters to which farmers in the 
network the information is transferred, because some farmers, through their more central 
position, may be more capable to transmit the information. 
•  Those who promote innovations should also interact intensively with other agents who 
implicitly or explicitly contribute to the diffusion of innovation and influence farmers. In fact, 
the cumulative information that a producer gathers from all those interactions that allows him 
or her to consider risks and make the most rational decision on the adoption of an innovation. 
The study also points to several interesting topics for future research. One is to further explore the 
effects of social interactions on adoption focusing on the full set of interactions occurring within rural 
communities, including all interactions of farmers and other agents. This would allow a more detailed 
exploration of the diverse roles played by every farmer and by specific change agents and the application 
of the full range of tools offered by social network analysis.  
Farmers are linked to their neighbors through a diversity of interactions that span well beyond the 
sharing of information, such as risk sharing and credit, exchange of products and gifts, kin and friendship 
ties, and so on, all of which are likely to exert some influence on innovation processes. It would therefore 
be interesting to further explore the multiplex nature of the ties farmers become involved in and how 
those cumulatively influence the adoption of innovations. Additionally, it would be interesting to see how 
social networks as composed by dynamic multiplex ties evolve over time. 
Another challenge constitutes applying more-creative methods for sampling by using, for 
example, a combination of the classic snowballing and other more ego-centered approaches, or by 
concentrating the analysis on smaller populations defined through narrower boundaries where a full 
enumeration of the relevant network can be obtained.  
With regard to the inclusion of social network parameters in econometric studies of adoption of 
innovation, the challenge may be to find solutions to the independence condition that variables need to 
fulfill and that network parameters, by definition, cannot fulfill. Even more challenging may be to start 
experimenting with approaches that would integrate more intimately and evenly the contributions of 
social network analysis and econometrics to the study of innovation. This might entail formulating 
socioeconomic models that include not only vectors of attributes depicting the relational characteristics of 
the network but also matrices of interaction to consider more intimately the complex effects of 
interactions on the dependent variable.   52
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